How to independently and efficiently benchmark executive compensation for Say-on-Pay

There are many software applications and tools now available to support compensation decisions, but what should be taken into consideration before purchasing? This 5-minute guide details what Compensation Committees, Heads of Reward and Compensation Professionals should take into account when selecting software and tools for Say-on-Pay decisions.

08.04.2020

A 5-minute guide to support Compensation Committees, Heads of Reward and Compensation Professionals when selecting software and tools for compensation decisions. Read and learn about the four considerations that should be taken into account before purchasing.

1. Look for tools that support peer group modeling functionality

2. Access the same peer groups as leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis

3. Ensure Pay-for-Performance alignment and benchmarking tools are included

4. Check the quality of data available in the software platform you choose

We live in a digital age where access to information has never been easier. No longer having to scroll through complex and endless spreadsheets and obtain an analytical degree to understand trends – insights and information is at our fingertips.

For Compensation Committees, Heads of Rewards and Benefits, and Compensation Professionals it is no different.

Ensuring executive compensation, bonuses, and incentives are in line with market standards, has never been so important.

Activist activity has increased in 2020, with traditional investors changing their position from passive to active engagement and focusing on executive pay. In a recent article by the Financial Times, it was reported that misalignment of incentives and negative say-on-pay votes at annual meetings increase the likelihood of a company suffering share price underperformance.

Software that provides flexibility for assessing compensation in comparison to peers, and supports say-on-pay resolutions, is available and increasingly implemented by companies, activist investors, and proxy advisors.

When a user begins searching for compensation software there are questions typically asked:

  • – Does it contain information on the executive pay practices of my peers and competitors?
  • – How does is support benchmarking my company’s executive compensation practices?
  • – Does it show me how my company’s compensation practices are perceived in the market?
  • – Can I find tailored insights in seconds to be sure my company’s CEO, NEO and Director pay is aligned to market standard and company performance?

 

Sustainable and justifiable decisions surrounding executive compensation has kept rewards and benefits professionals up at night, with additional key questions that should be asked:

  • – How can I access high-quality, reliable executive compensation information that I do not need to maintain?
  • – Where can I find standardized compensation information for efficient comparison and instant benchmarking?
  • – What software and tools are available in the market that other compensation professionals, activist investors, proxy advisors and compensation consultants currently use?

 

How to utilize software and tools for fast, efficient, and flexible executive compensation and rewards benchmarking.

 

Greater scrutiny calls for companies and their boards to be one step ahead

Transparency encourages market confidence. With the current pandemic causing havoc on stock prices and resulting in employee layoffs, salary and bonuses paid to executives has again been pushed to the front and center.

Compensation policies and reporting are continuing to come under scrutiny from investors, shareholders, employees and the media. Boards must have clear and transparent compensation processes in place that allow for investors to see a fair comparison has been made of executive payouts and promised rewards, against peers and taking into account the broader market context.

How peer companies are adapting their executive compensation practices and adopting new measures needs to be clearly understood for socially responsible decisions about executive pay – continuing to be highlighted again by the events and happenings of 2020.

Decisions made need to be based on fact, not fiction, with easy to understand explanations for investors to digest. Granted, no one wants to become a media headline or attract attention from activist investors.

 

How can Compensation Committees, Heads of Reward and Compensation Professionals model different scenarios with software tools, and benchmark against their companies’ peers?

 

1. Look for tools that support peer group modeling functionality

 

Generating your own peer groups allows for benchmarking and comparison on a like for like basis. Companies that have very few similar peers in their region, index and sector might need to look further afield to design an appropriate group to justify the competitiveness of pay plans. Modeling against different peers can significantly change the scenario and perception of pay. Using CGLytics platform, fit-for-purpose peer groups can be created in seconds with access to 5,900+ globally listed companies, for instant comparison of compensation practices.

2. Access the same peer groups as leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis

 

Do you know how your compensation is viewed by activist investors and proxy advisors? As Glass Lewis and large activist investors are already using data and software provided by CGLytics, Compensation Committees should be doing the same. This allows Compensation Committees and Heads of Reward to proactively plan for, and justify, any compensation decisions that may attract unwanted attention.

Glass Lewis CEO and Executive Compensation analysis (used in their proxy papers globally) is found in the CGLytics platform ready for companies use.

As stated in the recent webinar by Glass Lewis’ SVP & Global Head, Research & Engagement, Aaron Bertinetti:

“All the data that we now use, whether it’s compensation data, peer data, or other types of governance data that we may need…we exclusively source from CGLytics. Not just within the United States but globally. The only other firm outside of Glass Lewis that has access to our methodology is CGLytics.”

Using the same data set, peer modeling and analytical tools as Glass Lewis, and leading institutional investors, for reviewing public company CEO compensation and Say on Pay proposals, results in Compensation Committees being market intelligent and one step ahead. This fosters better dialogue with stakeholders and data-based decisions justified with relevant and real-time information.

Learn how Glass Lewis Europe improved their executive compensation analysis with governance data from CGLytics

3. Ensure Pay-for-Performance alignment and benchmarking tools are included

 

Compensation Committees and HR Professionals are empowered by modeling scenarios against different KPIs and measurements using software tools. With the recent volatility in market performance, justifying indictors used to design compensation plans mitigates risk. Boards need to be equipped with in-depth analysis of their company’s pay practice and compare against their peers to preempt say on pay risk.

As mentioned by Ronald Kliphuis, Global Head of Rewards at Randstad (a large market leading global HR company):

“In the past only consultants had access to the information that CGLytics provides. We can now play with data and information and make fair comparisons. We understand the potential risks and vulnerabilities a lot better.”

Learn more about Randstad’s Head of Rewards making data-based decisions going into the AGM

Powerful pay-for-performance benchmarking tools allow for efficient comparison and automated output of CEO and executive compensation against competitors and peers.

4. Check the quality of data available in the software platform you choose

 

Where the data is sourced from and how often it is updated should be a concern when deciding on insights to trust for effective engagement. In addition to how many years of compensation data is recorded in the software platform. A wealth of global and structured data for meaningful comparison of executive compensation practices across industries and borders, should be a large consideration of tools purchased to support compensation decisions.

Compensation Committees, Head of Rewards and Benefits, and other HR Professionals can ensure reliability when using CGLytics software with executive compensation data sourced from millions of publicly listed company filings, proxy materials and social networks, which undergoes rigorous checks by a dedicated team of equity market research analysts 24/7. More than 10 years of historical compensation data is standardized for efficient comparison of 5,900+ companies’ pay and rewards across different regions, industries, and sectors.

Downloadable data and insights in an array of formats (such as excel) allow compensation professionals to model and easily transport charts directly into their board decks and presentations, for the ultimate time and cost savings.

 

CGLytics offers the broadest and deepest global compensation data set in the market for reviewing corporate executive compensation plans, assessing Say on Pay vote proposals and performing benchmarking analysis.

Contact CGLytics and learn about the governance tools available and currently used by institutional investors, activist investors and leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis for recommendations in their proxy papers.

Latest Industry News, Views & Information

Ubisoft’s sexual misconduct scandal reveals governance gaps

CGLytics reviews Ubisoft’s board and corporate governance practices after accusations of widespread, systemic sexual misconduct. How does Ubisoft’s board diversity, board effectiveness and director expertise measure up?

Ontex Group’s remuneration report voted down for the fourth consecutive year

With shareholders voting against the Ontex Group’s remuneration report for four consecutive years, CGLytics has conducted a review of the company’s CEO pay for performance against peers.

CNBC Report: More activist investors to focus on corporate governance and executive pay

This week CGLytics CEO discussed the increase in activist investor activity with CNBC Street Signs. New research from CGLytics reveals that activist investors are broadening their focus.

Ubisoft’s sexual misconduct scandal reveals governance gaps

CGLytics reviews Ubisoft’s board and corporate governance practices after accusations of widespread, systemic sexual misconduct. How does Ubisoft’s board diversity, board effectiveness and director expertise measure up?

08.03.2020

Following recent accusations of widespread, systemic sexual misconduct at the family-run video game company Ubisoft, CGLytics has assessed the company’s financial performance and corporate governance practices. With reports of a toxic culture and sexism, how does Ubisoft’s board diversity (including gender diversity), board effectiveness and director expertise measure up?

Ubisoft, best known for the Assassin’s Creed franchise, has been shaken by allegations of serious misconduct. Reported cases include ‘subtle forms of sexism’ and ‘sexual assault’ and were apparently mishandled by the company’s human resources department. These reports come as the video gaming industry faces its own #Metoo movement.

Serge Hascoët (chief creative officer and considered number two at Ubisoft), Yannis Mallat (managing director of Ubisoft’s Canadian studios) and Cécile Cornet (global head of human resources) have resigned; the latter only having left her position, not the company.

Chief executive (CEO) of the family business, Yves Guillemot, made a speech via video distributed to all employees on July 21, 2020. In the video, an apology was made, and he announce several new measures being put in place. These included the creation of a “Support and Recovery Centre” in order to put victims in contact with specialized psychologists, trainings for the prevention of harassment and discrimination, and the overhaul of HR services. Mr. Guillemot insisted on improving diversity stating, “We have started the process to recruit three new VPs. The profiles belonging to under-represented and diverse groups will be privileged”.

Further testimonies shone the light on how female characters have been discarded or relegated to second place in the firm’s video games, notably in the Assassin’s Creed franchise. According to Bloomberg, developers attested that both the marketing department and Serge Hascoët suggested that they “would not sell”.

Ubisoft’s board gender diversity does not meet French corporate governance code recommendations

On reviewing the diversity of Ubisoft’s board, it is revealed that there are deficiencies and improvements needed. Only recently appointed John Parkes is a non-French member, meaning that only 8% of the board are non-local. More importantly, Ubisoft has not met the French corporate governance code recommendation of at least 40% gender diversity representation on the board. The company currently has four female board members, which constitutes 33% of the board. Moreover, the Ubisoft shows an independence ratio of less than half (42%), which also seems to contradict the code’s recommendations. Perhaps contributing to the poor diversity and independence score is the fact that in July 2020, the Ubisoft board appointed Mr Parkes; a dependent director to replace female independent director, Frédérique Dame.

Ubisoft Board Diversity Overview

Board diversity
Source: CGLytics diversity snapshot

CGLytics data also suggests that the company has a relatively unsound board compared to most of their peers. Specifically, as certain Board members Yves Guillemot, Michel Guillemot, Claude Guillemot, Christian Guillemot and Gerard Guillemot – all of whom are executives – have spent over three decades on the board since their respective appointments in 1988, affecting the average tenure on the board.

A scandal likely to hit the company’s financial results

Nonetheless, Ubisoft reported a successful first quarter of its 2020-2021 fiscal year. People having been quarantined due to the coronavirus pandemic undoubtedly helped achieve a 17.6% rise in sales (to EUR 427.3 million). The video games maker also saw its net bookings amounting to EUR 410 million between April and June (an increase of 30.5%), beating the target (EUR 335 million). For the current quarter, however, net bookings are expected to be around EUR 290 million, a decrease of 16% compared to the high performance of the same period during the previous fiscal year.

In the light of the fruitful quarter, we undertook a historical study of some key financial indicators to identify trends and perhaps understand what lies ahead for the company.

Although Ubisoft’s share price continues to rise, we found that all other indicators such as EPS, ROE and TSR fell quite heavily from 2018 to 2019 and are even expected to fall much steeper considering their YTD performance on these indicators. These are indications that, despite the rather glossy first quarter results published earlier this month, the company may suffer some deeper performance issues which could be a result of their recent scandal.

Ubisoft’s Financial Results (2015-YTD)

Ubisoft financial results
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Understanding Ubisoft’s board effectiveness and expertise

Using CGLytics’s board effectiveness tool, it is found that Ubisoft’s board attains an effectiveness score of 55%. This score is derived from 13 key board effectiveness attributes, benchmarked against corporate governance codes and standards. This mark shows that the issuer trails behind the average score of their sector peers (at 71%), and their unique peer group average.

One key metric that contributes to the score is the separation of Chair and CEO position. Considering that Ubisoft have the combined position of Chair and CEO, this is not in the company’s favor. The French corporate governance code gives issuers the choice to separate the positions or to combine. In the latter case, they must appoint a lead independent director. Ubisoft has a presence of a lead director on the board.

Ubisoft’s Board Composition and Effectiveness Score

Ubisoft board composition and effectiveness
Source: CGLytics board effectivess tool

Gaps revealed on Ubisoft’s board

Utilizing the board expertise and skills set tool found on the CGLytics platform, the analytics suggests gaps in the skills on the board. Specifically, not one of the independent directors has ‘Industry’ expertise, depicting their lack of ability to stay up to date with the market and trends compared to their peers. The board also has no representation of directors with governance expertise, questioning again their ability to apprehend the governance reforms promised by the company to address diversity.

Ubisoft’s Board Expertise and Skills

Board expertise and skills matrix
Source: CGLytics board expertise and skills marix

What’s to come for Ubisoft

Although reforms are expected for Ubisoft, and both changes in its governance and in its executive team have been promised, the company currently shows gaps of diversity among its senior leaders. Diversity does not only refer to the gender imbalance revealed, but also the decades-long tenure of its executive directors, plus the low ratio of foreign nationals. Not to forget the independence among its board members. Using CGLytics data and tools, it reveals Ubisoft’s board poses a serious governance risk. When comparing Ubisoft’s corporate governance practices to their peers’, they are not meeting market standards. As Ubisoft continues to navigate through the public scandal and implement changes to corporate culture, what remains to be seen is the impact on the financials of the video games specialist.

 

References:

https://www.bloomberg.com/

https://www.numerama.com/

https://www.journaldemontreal.com/

CGLytics provides access to 5,900 globally listed company profiles and their governance practices, including their CEO Pay for Performance, board composition, diversity, expertise and skills.

Latest Industry News, Views & Information

Ontex Group’s remuneration report voted down for the fourth consecutive year

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CNBC Report: More activist investors to focus on corporate governance and executive pay

This week CGLytics CEO discussed the increase in activist investor activity with CNBC Street Signs. New research from CGLytics reveals that activist investors are broadening their focus.

Aston Martin: Speeding Towards 8th Bankruptcy or Revitalization?

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How to independently and efficiently benchmark executive remuneration for Say-on-Pay

There are many software applications and tools now available to support remuneration decisions, but what should be taken into consideration before purchasing? This 5-minute guide details what Remuneration Committees, Heads of Reward and Compensation Professionals should take into account when selecting software and tools for remuneration decisions.

07.28.2020

A 5-minute guide to support Remuneration Committees, Heads of Reward and Compensation Professionals when selecting software and tools for remuneration decisions. Read and learn about the four considerations that should be taken into account before purchasing.

1. Look for tools that support peer group modeling functionality

2. Access the same peer groups as leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis

3. Ensure Pay-for-Performance alignment and benchmarking tools are included

4. Check the quality of data available in the software platform you choose

We live in a digital age where access to information has never been easier. No longer having to scroll through complex and endless spreadsheets and obtain an analytical degree to understand trends – insights and information is at our fingertips.

For Remuneration Committees, Heads of Rewards and Benefits, and Compensation Professionals it is no different.

Ensuring executive remuneration, bonuses, and incentives are in line with market standards, has never been under such scrutiny.

Activist activity has increased in 2020, with traditional investors changing their position from passive to active engagement and focusing on executive pay. In a recent article by the Financial Times, it was reported that misalignment of incentives and negative say-on-pay votes at annual meetings increase the likelihood of a company suffering share price underperformance.

Software that provides flexibility for assessing remuneration in comparison to peers, and supports say-on-pay resolutions, is available and increasingly implemented by companies, activist investors, and proxy advisors.

When a user begins searching for remuneration software there are questions typically asked:

  • – Does it contain information on the executive remuneration practices of – peers and competitors?
  • – How does is support benchmarking my company’s executive remuneration practices?
  • – Does it show me how my company’s remuneration practices are perceived in the market?
  • – Can I find tailored insights in seconds to be sure my company’s CEO, NEO and Director pay is aligned to market standard and company performance?

 

Sustainable and justifiable decisions surrounding executive remuneration has kept compensation professionals up at night, with additional key questions that should be asked:

  • – How can I access high-quality, reliable executive compensation information that I do not need to maintain?
  • – Where can I find standardized remuneration information for efficient comparison and instant benchmarking?
  • – What software and tools are available in the market that other compensation professionals, activist investors, proxy advisors and compensation consultants currently use?

 

How to utilize software for fast, efficient, and flexible executive remuneration and rewards benchmarking, and the tools that are available.

 

Greater scrutiny calls for companies and their boards to be one step ahead

Transparency encourages market confidence. With the current pandemic causing havoc on stock prices and resulting in employee layoffs, salary and bonuses paid to executives has again been pushed to the front and center.

Remuneration policies and reporting are continuing to come under scrutiny from investors, shareholders, employees and the media. Boards must have clear and transparent remuneration processes in place that allow for investors to see a fair comparison has been made of executive payouts and promised rewards, against peers and taking into account the broader market context.

How peer companies are adapting their executive remuneration practices and adopting new measures needs to be clearly understood for socially responsible decisions about executive pay – continuing to be highlighted again by the events and happenings of 2020.

Decisions made need to be based on fact, not fiction, with easy to understand explanations for investors to digest. Granted, no one wants to become a media headline or attract attention from activist investors.

 

How can Remuneration Committees, Heads of Reward and Compensation Professionals model different scenarios with software tools, and benchmark against their companies’ peers?

 

1. Look for tools that support peer group modeling functionality

 

Generating your own peer groups allows for benchmarking and comparison on a like for like basis. Companies that have very few similar peers in their region, index and sector might need to look further afield to design an appropriate group to justify the competitiveness of pay plans. Modeling against different peers can significantly change the scenario and perception of pay. Using CGLytics platform, fit-for-purpose peer groups can be created in seconds with access to 5,900+ globally listed companies, for instant comparison of remuneration practices.

2. Access the same peer groups as leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis

 

Do you know how your compensation is viewed by activist investors and proxy advisors? As Glass Lewis and large activist investors are already using data and software provided by CGLytics, Remuneration Committees should be doing the same. This allows Remuneration Committees and Heads of Reward to proactively plan for, and justify, any compensation decisions that may attract unwanted attention.

Glass Lewis CEO and Executive Compensation analysis (used in their proxy papers globally) is found in the CGLytics platform ready for companies use.

As stated in the recent webinar by Glass Lewis’ SVP & Global Head, Research & Engagement, Aaron Bertinetti:

“All the data that we now use, whether it’s compensation data, peer data, or other types of governance data that we may need…we exclusively source from CGLytics. Not just within the United States but globally. The only other firm outside of Glass Lewis that has access to our methodology is CGLytics.”

Using the same data set, peer modeling and analytical tools as Glass Lewis, and leading institutional investors, for reviewing public company CEO compensation and Say on Pay proposals, results in Remuneration Committees being market intelligent and one step ahead. This fosters better dialogue with stakeholders and data-based decisions justified with relevant and real-time information.

learn how Glass Lewis Europe improved their executive compensation analysis with governance data from CGLytics

3. Ensure Pay-for-Performance alignment and benchmarking tools are included

 

Remuneration Committees and Compensation Professionals are empowered by modeling scenarios against different KPIs and measurements using software tools. With the recent volatility in market performance, justifying indictors used to design compensation plans mitigates risk. Boards need to be equipped with in-depth analysis of their company’s pay practice and compare against their peers to preempt say on pay risk.

As mentioned by Ronald Kliphuis, Global Head of Rewards at Randstad (a large market leading global HR company):

“In the past only consultants had access to the information that CGLytics provides. We can now play with data and information and make fair comparisons. We understand the potential risks and vulnerabilities a lot better.”

Learn more about Randstad’s Head of Rewards making data-based decisions going into the AGM

Powerful pay-for-performance benchmarking tools allow for efficient comparison and automated output of CEO and executive compensation against competitors and peers.

4. Check the quality of data available in the software platform you choose

 

Where the data is sourced from and how often it is updated should be a concern when deciding on insights to trust for effective engagement. In addition to how many years of compensation data is recorded in the software platform. A wealth of global and structured data for meaningful comparison of executive compensation practices across industries and borders, should be a large consideration of tools purchased to support remuneration decisions.

Remuneration Committees, Head of Rewards and Benefits, and other Compensation Professionals can ensure reliability when using CGLytics software with executive compensation data sourced from millions of publicly listed company filings, proxy materials and social networks, which undergoes rigorous checks by a dedicated team of equity market research analysts 24/7. More than 10 years of historical compensation data is standardized for efficient comparison of 5,900+ companies’ pay and rewards across different regions, industries, and sectors.

Downloadable data and insights in an array of formats (such as excel) allow compensation professionals to model and easily transport charts directly into their board decks and presentations, for the ultimate time and cost savings.

 

CGLytics offers the broadest and deepest global remuneration data set in the market for reviewing corporate executive remuneration plans, assessing Say on Pay vote proposals and performing benchmarking analysis.

Contact CGLytics and learn about the governance tools available and currently used by institutional investors, activist investors and leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis for recommendations in their proxy papers.

Latest Industry News, Views & Information

Ontex Group’s remuneration report voted down for the fourth consecutive year

With shareholders voting against the Ontex Group’s remuneration report for four consecutive years, CGLytics has conducted a review of the company’s CEO pay for performance against peers.

CNBC Report: More activist investors to focus on corporate governance and executive pay

This week CGLytics CEO discussed the increase in activist investor activity with CNBC Street Signs. New research from CGLytics reveals that activist investors are broadening their focus.

Aston Martin: Speeding Towards 8th Bankruptcy or Revitalization?

A skill-deficient board led to the overestimation of Aston Martin’s market appeal. How does the introduction of new CEO Tobias Moers impact Aston Martin’s board composition, skillset, and expertise?

Ontex Group’s remuneration report voted down for the fourth consecutive year

With shareholders voting against the Ontex Group’s remuneration report for four consecutive years, CGLytics has conducted a review of the company’s CEO pay for performance against peers.

07.27.2020

Ontex Group’s remuneration report has been voted down by its shareholders for the fourth consecutive year. So, what is it about Ontex’s CEO compensation strategy that rubs shareholders up the wrong way?

Ontex trades on the Belgium stock market and operates in the sector of disposable personal hygiene solutions for baby, feminine and adult care. It manufactures and sells its products throughout Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Americas, and has a general global presence.

Since Ontex’s introduction on the stock market in 2014, shareholders have been unconvinced about the company’s remuneration practices. In 2015 at the company’s first Annual General Meeting since being listed, 10 % of its shareholders voted against the remuneration report.

The following year would see the number increase to a 12% disapproval. By their 2017 Annual General Meeting, the majority (51%) of its shareholders voted against the report and the numbers have not dropped since. The highest number of votes against the remuneration report came at the recent 2020 general shareholders meeting with a resounding 64% of shareholders voting against, which is a 7% increase relative to their 2019 proxy season.

Ontex’s Chairman and Member of the Remuneration Committee, Mr. Luc Missorten, resigned at the 2020 AGM and stated that:

“The company acknowledged the disapproval of the remuneration report and has taken the signals by shareholders seriously and as a consequence, going forward, will increase transparency within the report and intensify the dialogue with shareholders about the remuneration principles”[1]

CGLytics has taken Ontex’s remuneration report voting outcomes from its governance data base, accessible in the market-leading platform, and analyzed the results from the past six years. The below graphical representation reveals how the voting outcomes have evolved.

Ontex Group's Remuneration Report Voting Outcomes

Remuneration voting outcomes
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

The remuneration (through the lens of CEO pay)

Up until 2018, Ontex’s CEO remuneration consisted of base salary, Short-Term Incentives (STIs), and Long-Term Incentives (LTIs) in the form of restricted share units and performance stock options. A third element, in the form of performance shares, was added to the LTI plan in 2019 to increase the performance aspect of the plan and link remuneration to the company’s performance.

Base salary surged to EUR 1 million in 2019. Previous years saw the fixed portion of CEO remuneration hover between the EUR 800K and 900K mark. This is despite a significant drop (62%) in the company’s net income in 2019, and other Belgium company CEO’s only seeing their base salary hover between EUR 700 and EUR 830K over the same period.

 

The updated remuneration plan also provided Ontex’s CEO with the opportunity to earn an STI (annual bonus) pay-out of 150% of base salary. Both Ontex’s CEO and country peer group average was relatively the same, fluctuating between EUR 550K and EUR 1.1 million over the period.

Our analysis revealed that Ontex’s STI is not subject to any claw-back provision. The absence of such a provision prevents the company from retrieving funds already paid in the event of misconduct, poor performance, or a drop in company profits. The claw-back provision clause is widely used by other Belgium companies.

 

A review of Ontex’s LTIs tells a rather different story. Where CEOs of Belgium listed companies earn, on average, EUR 650K to 1.4 million in long-term incentives, the LTI component of the Ontex’s CEO, on the other hand, has not surpassed EUR 275K in pay-outs and is an indication of the company performance not being up to par relative to their peers on the BEL 20.

Further analysis revealed that Ontex has been underperforming on the BEL 20 Index over one, two, three and five-year periods, and since its initial listing in 2014. The poor performance has led to Euronext demoting Ontex from the BEL 20 (Large Cap) and including the company in the BEL Mid (Mid Cap), in addition, their second largest investor (ENA Investment Capital) called on the Board to take immediate action to create shareholder value[2][3].

According to our analysis, using CGLytics Executive Compensation tools found in the software solution, below is how Ontex CEO realized pay stacks up against its country peers.

CEO pay country peers
Source: CGLytics Pay for Performance Analytics

Upon analyzing the relative position of Ontex’s CEO pay compared to performance (over three years), it was noticed that Ontex displays a misalignment in its remuneration practice relative to its Belgian peers. Specifically, our analysis indicates that Ontex has been overcompensating its CEO. The company performance (measured in TSR) ranks among the lowest, whereas its compensation (total realized pay) ranks at the 50th percentile.

Pay for performance - Ontex
Source: CGLytics Pay for Performance Analytics

The persistent disapproval of Ontex’s remuneration report by shareholders has prompted the company to take steps to enhance its remuneration policy, by making remuneration clearer and even more closely correlated with performance, according to the company Board of Directors. As to how the Board is planning on doing this, is yet to be known and seen.

 

Contact CGLytics and learn about the governance tools available and currently used by institutional investors, activist investors and leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis for recommendations in their proxy papers.

 

CGLytics provides access to 5,900 globally listed company profiles and their governance practices, including their CEO Pay for Performance, board composition, diversity, expertise, and skills.

Latest Industry News, Views & Information

CNBC Report: More activist investors to focus on corporate governance and executive pay

This week CGLytics CEO discussed the increase in activist investor activity with CNBC Street Signs. New research from CGLytics reveals that activist investors are broadening their focus.

Aston Martin: Speeding Towards 8th Bankruptcy or Revitalization?

A skill-deficient board led to the overestimation of Aston Martin’s market appeal. How does the introduction of new CEO Tobias Moers impact Aston Martin’s board composition, skillset, and expertise?

Wirecard Pre- and Post-Scandal: A Board Effectiveness Analysis

This article examines Wirecard’s corporate governance practices, board effectiveness score compared to their DAX and sector peers, and shortfalls in board expertise pre- and post-scandal.

Aston Martin: Speeding Towards 8th Bankruptcy or Revitalization?

A skill-deficient board led to the overestimation of Aston Martin’s market appeal. How does the introduction of new CEO Tobias Moers impact Aston Martin’s board composition, skillset, and expertise?

07.09.2020

After six years of successive losses, CEO Andy Palmer oversaw a return to profit for Aston Martin in 2017. However, failures since its October 2018 Initial Public Offering (IPO) led to board and management changes and revealed how an unbalanced and skill-deficient board led to an overestimation of the company’s market appeal.

Background 

Aston Martin, the British luxury car manufacturer whose iconic DB5 model is synonymous with James Bond, has never monetized on its classic brand, with less than 120,000 cars sold in its 107-year history, yet counting seven bankruptcies in the same span.  Andy Palmer was appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in September 2014; determined to turn its fortunes around. He stated at the time: “Aston Martin has always relied on someone stepping in and injecting some more cash and saving it. But that’s not the legacy I want to leave”.(1)

Second Century & IPO

Mr. Palmer indicated short-term planning caused Aston Martin’s previous bankruptcies, as it never generated enough funds from released cars to produce new generation models.(2)

“In the first century we went bankrupt seven times, the second century is about making sure that is not the case…we need to be less dependent on a narrow product ratio and one type of customer…” (3,4)

Aston Martin launched its ‘Second Century’ in 2015 and planned to revitalize its fortunes by releasing seven cars in seven years, including the DB11, Vantage, Vanquish, and its first all-electric car, the DBX.(5) The DB 11 coupe, the first car of the plan was released in 2016 and was well received, helping push Aston Martins total sales to 5,117 in 2017, its highest in nine years(6) and resulted in profits of EUR 87M, its first profit since 2010.(7)

Given the initial success of the Second Century plan, in August 2018 Aston Martin announced its plan to offer at least 25% of its shares in an Initial Public Offering (IPO), the first of a U.K. carmaker in over three decades.(8) In preparation for its IPO, Aston Martin added multiple directors to the board: former InterContinential Hotels CEO Richard Solomons, former Sainsbury’s executive Imelda Walsh, former Deutsche Bank & Deloitte director Peter Espenhahn, and NYU professor Tensie Whelan. Former Coca-Cola executive Penny Hughes was appointed as its first female chairwoman on September 10th, 2018. She was independent on appointment in line with recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance code.

Mr. Palmer described the additions as a “significant milestone in our history and of the successful turnaround of the company.”(9) He felt the new directors, would help Aston Martin avoid its past mistakes by fostering a level of governance it previously lacked.(10) Expectations were high for its IPO, Mr. Palmer claimed “unprecedented” interest from investors. Aston Martin estimated its maximum value of over EUR 5 Billion, with shares trading between EUR 18.50 and EUR 20 a share.(11) It expected to sell between 6,200-6,400 cars in 2018, 7,100-7,300 in 2019, and 9,600-9,800 in 2020.(12)

Underwhelming IPO

On October 3, 2018, Aston Martin began trading on the London Stock Exchange under the ticker ‘AML’ at EUR 19 a share. The debut went poorly, with shares going for as low as EUR 17.75 a share, placing it in the FTSE 250 instead of its intended target of the FTSE 100.

By February 2019, it had lost nearly half its market cap from the IPO and reported an annual loss of EUR 68 Million for fiscal 2018, despite increased total car sales of 6,441 in 2018, due to the EUR 136 Billion it used to secure its listing.(13) Mr. Palmer stated that Aston Martin was only worried about the long-term performance of its stock, but there is reason to question whether its fortunes will improve.

In July 2019, with weak sales for The Vantage, the second model in the ‘Second Century’ plan, and economic uncertainty surrounding Brexit, Aston Martin revised its 2019 sales forecast to 6,400 cars from 7,300. The market cap of the company fell below EUR 1.5 Billion in August 2019, from its market cap of EUR 4.6 Billion at its IPO.(14) Non-executive director Najeeb Al Humaidhi sold his stake in Aston Martin in August 2019, a damning indictment on the ability of Mr. Palmer and the board to stabilize its finances.(15)

Something amiss in the skills and diversity matrix?

Data reviewed in the CGLytics software platform suggests Aston Martin’s board lacked the expertise and necessary independence to properly gauge its market appeal. The Pre-IPO board additions increased the size of Aston Martins board to 14 directors, 5 being independent non-executive directors, with 3 of the 14 directors women.

According to the Division of Responsibilities section of the UK Corporate Governance code Principal G states that:

“the board should include an appropriate combination of executive and non-executive (and in-particular, independent non-executive directors) such that no small group of individuals dominates the board’s decision making”.

The 11th Provision states that:

“at least half the board, excluding the chair, should be non-executive directors whom the board considers to be independent”.(16)

In addition to the UK Corporate Governance code, the Davies Commission stated that by 2020, a third of all directors should be women.(17)

Aston Martin stated its intention to follow all principles and provisions of the UK Governance code and the Davies Commission within a year. Nonetheless, with the 5 independent directors joining the board within a month of its IPO, it is likely that the executive directors and shareholder representing non-executive directors, dominated the board’s decision making. With more of a stake in its IPO, they were more inclined to overestimate Aston Martin’s market appeal.

Below is a display of Aston Martin’s Board Expertise and Diversity on October 3rd, 2018, before its IPO.

AM Board Expertise and Skills
AM Board Diversity
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Reviewing Aston Martins Board Expertise in CGLytics Board Effectiveness tool, of the directors on the board at the time, four had skills in Marketing: Andrew Palmer, Penny Hughes, Peter Rogers, and Matthew Carrington. While seeming sufficient, it should be noted that both Penny Hughes and Matthew Carrington were appointed to Aston Martin’s board just a month before its listing, which is not enough time for a director to immerse themselves and significantly contribute in the marketing strategy prior to the IPO. Peter Rogers was a shareholder’s representative, who would benefit if the IPO met or exceeded internal valuation; Mr. Palmer, as the chief executive was entitled to share awards up to E3.6m.(18)

The diagram also suggests that there was no director with Technology expertise, which is necessary for most issuers. Additionally, we find that the Board at the time of the IPO also lacked expertise in Governance. It is however interesting to point out that the Board had strong presence in Industry and Sector, Leadership, International, Executive, and Financial expertise.

Lawrence Stroll injects cash in Aston Martin. Management & Board changes begin

Despite Andy Palmer’s intention for nobody to save Aston Martin again, in January 2020 with losses mounting, and with no alternative but a substantial investment, Aston Martin sold a 20% stake to a group lead by Lawrence Stroll, who became Executive Chairman in April 2020 as part of the deal. Peter Rodgers passed away in February 2020, Penny Hughes stepped down as Chairwoman on April 7, 2020, and Richard Solomons, Imelda Walsh, and Tensie Whelan, all independent directors appointed before the IPO, declined to stand for re-election.(19) Aston Martin’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Mark Wilson, departed in April 2020. Mr. Palmer himself, stepped down in May 2020 with shares down over 90% since the IPO.(20)

New Voices, Same Results?

When Aston Martin announced the departure of Andy Palmer, its share price increased by over 40%, a sign the market believes a new CEO will reverse its fortune. Tobias Moers, the current Chief Executive Officer at Mercedes subsidiary AMG was appointed CEO of Aston Martin effective August 1st, 2020.(21) Kenneth Gregor was named the new Chief Financial Officer on June 22nd, 2020.(22)

With a new Executive Chairman, Chief Financial Officer, and Chief Executive Officer, it is reasonable to expect a new direction for Aston Martin, but data suggests Aston Martin may not be better off than before.

Lawrence Stroll, while the owner of Force India’s F1 Team and a car enthusiast, has no automotive expertise. Tobias Moers fails to diversify the Board’s expertise.

Below is a display of Aston Martin’s board expertise effective August 1st, 2020, when new CEO Tobias Moers assumes control:

AM Board Expertise and Skills post IPO
AM Board Diversity post IPO
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

In this scenario, Aston Martin has 9 directors, only 2 who are independent non-executive directors, a 22% independence ratio, an indication Aston Martin has not yet complied with principles and provisions of the UK Corporate Governance code. In August 2020, when the new CEO takes his position, the independence ratio will further drop to 20%. One thing that can also be missed is the lack of gender balance on Aston Martin’s Board. There is currently no female on the Board, Aston Martin is further away from meeting the recommendations of the Davies Commission than before its IPO.

On the expertise and skills side, although the board still has its independent marketing expert in Matthew Carrington, the imbalance between the groups of directors makes it unlikely he will sway the board.

With the new Board, we see a significant drop in their Leadership, Financial, International, Executive, Industry and Sector Expertise. The company still has no Director with Technology and Governance expertise; skills necessary to steer company’s affairs in the right direction.

Aston Martin’s choice to go public may ultimately have been ill-advised. While initially allowing it to raise cash, an IPO was always going to lock Aston Martin into certain financial performance metrics, that given its historical struggles, it was unlikely to meet, despite the initial upturn in fortune under Andy Palmer. Independent non-executive directors with less at stake are more likely to recognize and raise red flags, reducing risk and providing greater corporate governance.

How can Aston Martin improve their corporate governance and gain oversight of their board effectiveness going forward? CGLytics governance data and analytics tools provides the board composition analysis companies, investors and service provides need, now and in the future, to reduce risk and ensure company success.

Interested to see how your company stacks up against 5,900 globally listed companies’ governance practices including their CEO Pay for Performance, board composition, diversity, expertise and skills?

 

Click here to contact CGLytics and learn about the governance tools available and currently used by institutional investors, activist investors and leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis for recommendations in their proxy papers.

References:

[1] Hotten, R. (2015, March 5). Aston Martin battles to reinvent itself. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-31727799

[2] Padgett, M. (2016, March 7). Aston Martin promises 7 cars in 7 years–and profits. Motor Authority. https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1102701_aston-martin-promises-seven-cars-in-seven-years–and-profits

[3] Hotten, R. (2015, March 5). Aston Martin battles to reinvent itself. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-31727799

[4] Aston CEO calls crossover, daimler deal keys to revival. (2015, April 9). Automotive News Europe. https://europe.autonews.com/article/20150409/ANE/150409991/aston-ceo-calls-crossover-daimler-deal-keys-to-revival

[5] Hotten, R. (2015, March 5). Aston Martin battles to reinvent itself. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-31727799

[6] Tsui, C. (2018, January 4). Aston Martin reports record sales, sold more than 5,000 cars in 2017. The Drive. https://www.thedrive.com/article/17370/aston-martin-reports-record-sales-sold-more-than-5000-cars-in-2017

[7] Aston Martin roars back into the Black. (2018, February 26). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43204733

[8] Publication of Reg document & H1 2018 results – 06:03:04 29 Aug 2018 – News article | London stock exchange. (2018, August 29). London Stock ExchangeLondon Stock Exchange. https://www.londonstockexchange.com/news-article/market-news/publication-of-reg-document-amp-h1-2018-results/13770626

[9] Neate, R. (2018, September 25). Aston Martin names first female chair as it prepares for £5bn float. the Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/10/aston-martin-chair-float-penny-hughes

[10] Aston Martin bolsters board as luxury carmaker prepares for IPO. (2018, September 10). Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/0c35df58-b4c9-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe

[11] Ipo. (n.d.). astonmartinlagonda.com. https://www.astonmartinlagonda.com/investors/ipo

[12] Publication of Reg document & H1 2018 results – 06:03:04 29 Aug 2018 – News article | London stock exchange. (2018, August 29). London Stock ExchangeLondon Stock Exchange. https://www.londonstockexchange.com/news-article/market-news/publication-of-reg-document-amp-h1-2018-results/13770626

[13] Kollewe, J. (2020, February 3). Aston Martin shares crash as it reveals £136m IPO costs. the Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/feb/28/aston-martin-sets-aside-30m-for-brexit-as-revenues-rise

[14] Kollewe, J. (2019, November 7). Aston Martin blames tough European market for £13.5m loss. the Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/nov/07/aston-martin-blames-tough-european-market-for-135m-loss

[15] Aston Martin takes another hit as director sells $33 million stake. (n.d.). Driven. https://www.driven.co.nz/news/aston-martin-takes-another-hit-as-director-sells-33-million-stake/

[16] The UK Corporate Governance Code. (2018). Financial Reporting Council. https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf

[17] Aston Martin bolsters board as luxury carmaker prepares for IPO. (2018, September 10). Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/0c35df58-b4c9-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe

[18] Monaghan, A. (2018, September 25). Aston Martin boss in line for £7.2m package as £5.1bn float unveiled. the Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/20/not-a-bond-aston-martin-to-float-shares-on-stock-market

[19] Aston Martin drives through board changes after £104m loss. (2020, February 27). Accountancy Daily. https://www.accountancydaily.co/aston-martin-drives-through-board-changes-after-ps104m-loss

[20] Ziady, H. (2020, May 26). Aston Martin replaces CEO Andy Palmer with Mercedes-AMG chief. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/26/business/aston-martin-new-ceo/index.html

[21] Ziady, H. (2020, May 26). Aston Martin replaces CEO Andy Palmer with Mercedes-AMG chief. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/26/business/aston-martin-new-ceo/index.html

[22] Appointment of chief financial officer – 07:00:02 22 Jun 2020 – AML news article | London stock exchange. (2020, June 22). London Stock ExchangeLondon Stock Exchange. https://www.londonstockexchange.com/news-article/AML/appointment-of-chief-financial-officer/14586003

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07.06.2020

Wirecard AG, one of the leading Fintech companies in Europe and a DAX constituent, is now in the centre of a major accounting scandal. This article examines Wirecard’s corporate governance practices, board effectiveness score compared to their peers, and shortfalls in board expertise using CGLytics tools.

Wirecard’s now former CEO, Markus Braun, resigned with immediate effect from his position on June 19 and was arrested by German authorities on June 22, after the company’s auditor, EY, reported EUR 1.9 billion missing from the balance sheets, and refused to sign off Wirecard’s financial results[1].

Wirecard claimed that the missing amount does not exist and announced that the company has filed an application for insolvency on June 25[2]. The company’s shares were suspended from trading before it announced insolvency proceedings. Wirecard’s shares fell almost 90% after it admitted to the missing EUR 1.9 billion.

Right after the CEO’s resignation, Jan Marsalek, Wirecard’s former COO and a member of the Management Board, was dismissed (on June 22). James Freis, a former Director of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network for the United States Department of the Treasury and Managing Director, Group Chief Compliance Officer, and Group Anti-Money Laundering Officer at Deutsche Börse AG, was appointed interim CEO of Wirecard on June 19.

To evaluate if the Board of Wirecard was well equipped to prevent the fraud scandal, CGLytics looked at the expertise of Board Members and other factors that define the effectiveness of the Board prior to changes to its composition.

Gaps in board expertise

Prior to changes on the Management Board in June 2020, the Board of Directors of Wirecard consisted of five members of Supervisory Board and four members of Executive Board. According to the Board Expertise analysis, using CGLytics Governance Data and Analytics tools in the software platform, the Board at that time scored low on the Financial and Governance expertise, the two essential skills for successful oversight of financial compliance.

Wirecard’s Board Expertise and Skills Matrix

Wirecard Board Expertise
Source: CGLytics Expertise Diagram and Skills Matrix

Criticism of Wirecard has been raised already in 2019, when the Financial Times started an investigation into the company’s accounting conduct based on numerous whistleblowing cases. Wirecard was denying reports of misconduct and claimed such information was fake[4]. Both Markus Braun and Jan Marsalek, now former members of the Management Board, lacked Financial and Governance expertise, which was also the case with other members of the Management Board (except the Chief Financial Officer Alexander von Koop).

Thomas Eichelmann, independent member of the Supervisory Board and Chairman since January 2020, brings both Financial and Governance expertise to the Board, having served as Chief Financial Officer at Deutsche Börse AG and as a member and Chairman of numerous companies in Germany. Interestingly, he was one of the key figures in pushing Wirecard to undertake an independent review of its accounting issues. The company hired KPMG in October to start such an investigation[5].

With the appointment of James Freis as an interim CEO, the Board has gained compliance and legal experience, however, the Financial expertise is still lacking.

Board effectiveness analysis

To evaluate other factors that add to the Board success, CGLytics looked at various parameters that together form the ‘Board Effectiveness’ score. At the end of 2019 Wirecard’s Board was compared to other Boards in the DAX index at the time. The graph below shows the single score attached to each DAX constituent representing the company’s ‘Board Effectiveness’ coefficient.

In total, Wirecard shows the fifth highest effectiveness score compared to other index constituents (on a scale from 1 to 100).

Board Effectiveness Score of DAX Index (2019)

Wirecard board effectiveness on DAX
Source: CGLytics Board Effectiveness Score

Utilizing the CGLytics peer composer tool, we created a peer group for Wirecard based on their sector to evaluate the company in comparison to their sector peers.

Interestingly, our analysis suggests that Wirecard’s Board Effectiveness score, using the CGlytics Risk Rating tool, is the second highest among competitor companies, as per the end of 2019.

Board Effectiveness Analysis of Wirecard’s Sector Peers (2019)

Wirecard board effectiveness compared to peers
Source: CGLytics Risk Rating tool

Utilizing CGLytics’ Risk Rating tool, we were able to gain insights into Wirecard’s Board Effectiveness score pre- and post-scandal. Using December 2019 as a benchmark, we found that the company’s Board Effectiveness score improved from 78 points to 82 points in June 2020.

However, it is worth noting that the company decreased in Nationality Dispersion and Directors Tenure. Underlying metrics such as Gender Equality and Board Independence has also improved from December 2019 to June 2020.

Board Effectiveness of Wirecard Pre- and Post-Scandal

Board effectiveness pre and post scandal
Source: CGLytics Risk Rating tool

Destruction of Shareholders’ Value

In September 2018, Wirecard boasted of EUR 22.5 billion in market capitalization, and ascended to the blue-chip index of Germany replacing Commerzbank, the country’s second largest financier. However, due to this scandal, Wirecard’s share price has plunged and wiped off millions of dollars of profits for investors; notably a group of SoftBank executives and a UAE (Abu Dhabi) fund that invested in a complex USD 1 BLN trade on the company’s equity.

According to market reports, in April 2019, SoftBank Investment Advisors, which manages the group’s USD 100 billion Vision Fund, structured roughly USD 1 billion investment in Wirecard through a convertible bond. The investment fund is now set to miss out on millions in profits that it might have gained from the Wirecard trade.

What’s next for Wirecard?

After continuous denial of allegations from whistle-blowers and journalists, notably the Financial Times, Wirecard is now going through insolvency proceedings and its former CEO faces charges of misrepresenting the company’s accounts and market manipulation[6]. The Board of Directors of Wirecard had obvious gaps in Financial and Governance expertise, being unable to identify and respond to the issue from its early days. As a result, the shares of the company fell dramatically, leaving lenders and investment funds with losses.

Interested to see how your company stacks up against 5,900 globally listed companies’ governance practices including their CEO Pay for Performance, board composition, diversity, expertise and skills?

 

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07.01.2020

Takeaway.com has been on a mission for the past few years to assert its dominance as one of the world’s leading online food delivery service providers. In only six months the company has made two major acquisitions; acquiring Delivery Hero, Grubhub and merging with UK based Just Eat plc. All this while fending off counteroffers from competitors such as Prosus NV and out bidding rivals.

The Merger:

The merger between Takeaway.com and Just Eat took nearly six months to complete. The company had to fend off multiple bids, including a GBP 5.5 billion bid from competitor Prosus, the investment unit of South African internet conglomerate Naspers Limited.

The merger between the two companies was announced back in July 2019. Takeaway.com’s initial offer valued Just Eat at 731 pence per share (representing a 15 percent premium) and resulted in Just Eat shareholders owning 52.2 percent and Takeaway.com shareholders owning 47.8 percent of the share capital of the combined group.

The merger also brought significant changes in the combined group corporate governance structure, including, adopting a 2-tier board structure that comprises of an Executive Board and Supervisory Board. The 2-tier structure is a common practice laid out by the Dutch Corporate Governance code.

Additionally, change was announced to both the Supervisory and Executive board with the intention to increase the presence of both companies involved in the newly formed entity. The Supervisory Board increased from four to seven members with four members coming from Just Eat and the three from Takeaway.com.

On the Executive Board, the Co-Founder and CEO of Takeaway.com, Mr Jitse Groen, retained his position as CEO, Just Eat CFO took over as the Group CFO and the positions of COO would be shared as a Co-COO between the other two members.

The intended rearrangement was said to foster “a strong founder-led management team with years of combined experience in the sector”. [1]

CGLytics presented a scenario analysis of the board composition on the date of the announcement and what the board is comprised of before and after the merger.

Takeaway.com’s Board Expertise and Skill Matrix (pre-merger)

Takeaway.com board skills and expertise
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Just Eat Takeaway Board Expertise and Skill Matrix (post-merger)

Takeaway.com and Just Eat board skills and expertise
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

In the post-merger analysis, there is improvement to the overall board structure. Governance expertise are increased as well as Financial expertise, which are core competencies and imperative to a board. In a market with tough competition, that includes big names such as Uber Eats, Deliveroo, plus others gradually increasing their presence, not having the right expertise and skills on the board pose corporate governance risks.

The analysis also reveals that the company is lacking in Technology expertise. For a company that carries out most of its business online, it should be an expertise area worth considering to improve.

As much as the merger seemed a good fit for both companies involved, South African owned Prosus had other intentions. The company twice increased its hostile bid for Just Eat including a GBP 5.5 billion bid in cash (740 pence per share), which the company deemed “a more compelling and certain value for Just Eat shareholders at a further premium to Takeaway.com’s offer”[2].

Nonetheless, Takeaway.com was offering Just Eat shareholders more control whereas Prosus’ offer was looking to decrease their control. Just Eat shareholders ultimately rebuffed Prosus’ offer citing the bid as “significantly undervaluing” the group [3].

At the beginning of 2020, rumours started circulating that a deal had been met; Takeaway.com and Just Eat settled on an implied value of 916 pence per share. Subsequently, on February 3, 2020, Just Eat announced it had suspended its listing and trading on the London Stock Exchange. The combined company was renamed to Just Eat Takeaway. The new partnership has brought changes to the company’s compensation strategy.

The Acquisitions:

Within the past year Takeaway.com has made multiple acquisitions.

In 2019 the company won the battle with Delivery Hero in the German market, agreeing to buy the larger rival’s activities in Germany in a deal worth EUR 930 million.

In 2020, after nearly a month of negotiations, US based Grubhub stepped away from a potential acquisition from Uber Eats after concerns of antitrust and instead merged with the newly formed Just Eat Takeaway. The company agreed to acquire Grubhub for USD 7.3 billion in stock. The deal will see the company be able to take on rivals such as Uber Eats and DoorDash, which are also based in the US market.

Just Eat Takeaway shareholders will control around 70 per cent of the combined company, while the rest will be owned by Grubhub’s investors. After the deal, Just Eat Takeway’s CEO was quoted as stating:

“Would it be better to just wait one year after every transaction? Yes, sure. We’d get more sleep. But that’s just not how the world turns” [4]

Impact on CEO Compensation:

During the company’s 2020 Annual General Meeting (AGM), shareholders agreed to significantly increase the bonuses of the CEO and Executive Board. Where it was absent prior, there will be a Short-Term Bonus (STI) of a maximum of 150 percent of the base salary and an on target of 75 percent of basic salary.

In addition, there has been an adjustment to the Long-Term Incentive (LTI). The LTI has increased from a maximum of 150 percent to a maximum of 200 percent of the base salary and will be paid in the form of performance shares rather than performance stock options. The pay is, of course, dependent upon the achievement of performance objectives such as revenue growth relative TSR and a strategic target. [5]

The below table provides an example of what the potential earnings for the CEO might look like if all performance objectives are met versus what was earnt over the past two years.

CEO earnings
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

The company argued that the adjustment is to align the remuneration policy with the current size, scope and complexity of the company following the merger with Just Eat. Shareholders seem to agree to the proposal, which earned a resounding 99.2 percent approval at the 2020 AGM.

Takeaway.com is on a mission to become the worlds largest online food delivery service provider and based on the company’s most recent actions, one would say it is well on its way. However, it is not going to be easy road, out-bidding rivals and fending off large competitors in order to do so.

Interested to see how your company stacks up against 5,900 globally listed companies’ governance practices including their CEO Pay for Performance, board composition, diversity, expertise and skills?

 

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06.30.2020

At Tesco’s annual general meeting (AGM) on Friday June 26, 2020, two-thirds of the shareholders voted against the resolution to approve the Directors’ 2019 remuneration report. As mentioned in the previous article published by CGLytics earlier this month, this decision was mainly due to Tesco’s remuneration committee inflating executive bonuses by removing Ocado’s stock price from the peer group used to estimate its performance. In addition to this, Glass Lewis’ decision to advise investors to vote against Tesco’s remuneration report had substantial influence over the final results.

For the record, the exclusion of Ocado from Tesco’s peer group, whose stock has increased dramatically in the recent years, led to an outperformance by 3.3% of Tesco’s Total Shareholder Return (TSR) against its peer group instead of an underperformance by 4.2% in the case of Tesco keeping Ocado in the peer group.

If Tesco’s TSR was below its peer group index, the TSR metric, which is weighted at 0.5 of the 2017 Performance Share Plan (PSP), would have been zero. As a result, this boosted the payments to the CEO and CFO by approximately GBP 1.6 million and GBP 0.87 million, respectively.

Click here for more details about Tesco’s shareholder revolt prior to their AGM.

Tesco announced its AGM results[1] stating that:

“we recognise, however, that a significant number of shareholders had concerns with the principle of the Committee’s adjustment to the TSR comparator group”.

Moreover Tesco added that:

“following recent engagement on our Remuneration Report with a number of our larger shareholders, we have been reassured that the majority agree that the overall outcome of the 2017 PSP award is proportionate given the outstanding turnaround delivered by management”.

For now, the vote on directors’ remuneration report was not legally binding, meaning it is only advisory. Bonuses paid to the executives will still be paid out. On the other hand, the huge percentage of votes against the directors’ remuneration report (67.29%) is the largest pay revolt in Tesco’s history in the last decade.

We have seen that shareholder activism was used through Say on Pay at Tesco’s latest AGM, which means that in the future if the company is not transparent with its investors, investors will not hesitate to raise their voice against any decision they consider inappropriate or gullible.

Using data and analytics found in the CGLytics software platform, companies, investors, proxy advisors and service providers efficiently analyze and spot governance risks and red flags in seconds.

If Tesco understood how they were perceived by proxy advisor Glass Lewis prior to the proxy season and their AGM, they could have prepared adequately and avoided negative votes.

Would you like to see how your executive compensation is viewed by leading independent proxy advisor Glass Lewis and  large institutional investors?

Click here to contact CGLytics or learn more about the Glass Lewis CEO compensation analysis and peer group modeling for Say on Pay engagement, available exclusively via CGLytics.

 

Reference

[1] https://www.londonstockexchange.com/news-article/TSCO/result-of-agm/14593658

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Diversity on the Board? Metrics Used by Fortune 100 Companies

Examining the diversity of Fortune 100 boards and questioning the metrics currently used to disclose diversity. Are Fortune 100 companies providing the complete picture?

06.29.2020

This article examines the diversity of Fortune 100 companies’ boards, and questions the current metrics used to disclose diversity of board members. Due to the lack of uniformity of diversity disclosures, is the picture painted by some companies comprehensive enough to truly show diversity on their board?

The topic of diversity has grown in importance over the past decade. Large companies are spending time and resources discovering how having a diverse board of directors is affecting their company’s image, perception, and profits. Many companies focus on appointing employees with different education, experience, race, and backgrounds. This is illustrated through companies’ diversity statements. For example, Amazon.com, Inc. in their 2019 Proxy states,

“We take seriously our commitment to diversity and respect for people from all backgrounds, including gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and other dimensions of diversity, which are enduring values for us as reflected in a number of Company policies, including the Amazon Global Human Rights Principles.”[1]

 

Even with inclusive diversity statements, such as Amazon.com, Inc.’s, when calculating how diverse companies’ boards are, two main diversity metrics are used: gender and race. While acknowledging the positive effects of having a diverse board and showing how diversity is being valued in a company is important, examining how transparent companies are with their diversity metrics shines light on a company’s commitment to diversity.

Why is Board Diversity Beneficial for Companies?

The decisions that the board of directors make for corporations are critical for their success. The board impacts how the company is run by making crucial decisions on executive pay, dividend policies, setting yearly goals, and conducting any other business that concerns shareholders. Having a board composed of people with different backgrounds and experience will enrich conversations and allow the board to approach problems with new perspectives and ideas.[2]

Companies should actively try to understand and represent their clients and customers. In doing so, better marketing decisions and tactics can be set. For example, “Having a diverse board can help you better understand purchasing and usage decisions, particularly as studies have found that women drive 70-80 percent of purchasing in the United States.”[2]

CGLytics data of board diversity reveals the percentage of gender diversity and nationality dispersion on boards of Fortune 100 companies.

As depicted in the following graphs, Fortune 100 company boards are composed of mostly American men. Unfortunately, we can not determine percentages of race within these companies because very few companies disclose information on race/ethnicity. The missing data and the lack of transparency from these companies questions their commitment to diversity.

Fortune 100 diversity on boards
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Reporting Diversity

Based on the Fortune 100 companies’ 2018 and 2019 proxy statements, 23% of the Fortune 100 companies do not report information on diversity and the other 77% report the information using different metrics.

The reporting companies focus on gender alone, combine gender and race/ethnicity, or on nationality. There is no uniformity between companies or industries.  While most companies have statements in their proxies outlining the value of diversity and how they define it, the statements are not always represented in the graphs or numbers that break down their board diversity.

This is clearly shown in Caterpillar Inc.’s 2019 Proxy statement. The company lists one of their key characteristics of their board as being diverse of “race, ethnicity, gender, cultural background or professional experience.”[3]  This diversity statement implies that the board would be diverse. But it is unclear if it is as they combine gender and race in their data. In their governance highlights, Caterpillar Inc. lists their board as 45% diverse (gender and race combined).[3] By combining the percentage of gender and race, and not providing a breakdown of the directors’ backgrounds, it is difficult to determine if the board is diverse in race, ethnicity and gender.

Lack of uniformity when reporting diversity

When examining Fortune 100 companies for diversity, we find that it is difficult to compare companies’ information due to the lack of uniformity of how they are reporting data on board diversity.

For example, Delta Air Lines, Inc. and American Airlines Group Inc., both in the same industry, report their diversity metrics differently. At first glance, both companies report roughly equal percentages of diversity (38.5% and 40% respectively). However, American Airlines Group Inc. displays their information by separating gender and race/ethnicity.

Diversity of boards: Delta Air Lines and American Airlines
Source: Company disclosures found in the CGLytics software platform

Why would a company combine race/ethnicity and gender in their diversity graphs? One reason could be to increase the appearance of a diverse board.

Hypothetically, if Delta Airlines, Inc.’s board consisted of four white women and one non-white male and mirrored the American Airlines Group, Inc.’s diversity chart, it would show 38.5% diversity with 7% racially/ethnically diverse and 30.7% gender diverse. While the 30.7% gender diversity would be high for their industry (as shown in the follow graph), the racial/ethnically diversity would be low. This example could be switched with gender diversity being low and would highlight a similar problem. However, without clear diversity metrics, consumers and shareholders are left questioning Delta Airline’s commitment to diversity, which could result in a loss of business.

By combining the percentages of gender and racial diversity, Delta Air Lines is hiding who is represented on their board of directors. American Airlines Group, Inc. clearly shows their shareholders, investors, and the public that they value diversity and are prepared to make well informed decisions. What does clear diversity metrics look like?

Fortune 100: Women on boards by sector

Percent of women on Fortune 100 boards by sector
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Transparent diversity metrics should give the consumers and shareholders a comprehensive background of the members on the board. This should include race/ethnicity, gender, age, and industry experience. These metrics broaden the knowledge of the board, giving the board members the tools to make successful decisions.

This is illustrated in PepsiCo Inc.’s 2019 proxy statement. Their diversity statement is clear and backed by their diversity percentages. It states, “Diversity including understanding the importance of diversity to a global enterprise with a diverse consumer base, informed by experience of gender, race, ethnicity and/or nationality”[4]. This is clearly shown in multiple graphs that break down backgrounds of each director.

PepsiCo Inc.’s 2019 proxy statement

PepsiCo Inc.’s 2019 proxy statement
Source: Company disclosures found in the CGLytics software platform

It is recommended for more companies to design their diversity statements and data like PepsiCo Inc. They shared a comprehensive view of their board and proved their board was encompassed with directors of various backgrounds. This provides consumers and shareholders with confidence that the board is well equipped to make the best decisions for the success of the company.

To gain access to Governance Intelligence and Oversight of 5,900+ globally listed companies, contact CGLytics. Within the CGLytics software platform, access 125,000+ professional executives and their skills, expertise and backgrounds for recruiting board members and building a robust, diverse board.

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Bennett and the Ashford Companies: Corporate Governance Pitfalls and Lessons

The companies controlled by hotelier Monty Bennett have seen controversy for exploiting a government loan program designed to help small businesses. Learn how misaligned Pay for Performance, and an unbalanced board, can result in poor decision-making and increase governance risk.

Bennett and the Ashford Companies: Corporate Governance Pitfalls and Lessons

The companies controlled by hotelier Monty Bennett have seen controversy for exploiting a government loan program designed to help small businesses. Learn how misaligned Pay for Performance, and an unbalanced board, can result in poor decision-making and increase governance risk.

Poor corporate governance not only endangers a company’s operations and shareholder value, but also results in poor business decisions [1]. Board composition and executive compensation are key elements of corporate governance, and this article examines these key factors in relation to Bennett and the Ashford companies.

In April 2020, the group of hotel companies controlled by Texan hotelier Monty Bennett became the face of the controversies surrounding the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a program meant to help small businesses survive the economic impact of COVID-19. Three public companies controlled by Bennett (Ashford Inc., Ashford Hospitality Trust and Braemar Hotels & Resorts) applied for USD 126 million in loans under the PPP and received at least USD 58 million in return. The Ashford group is the largest known applicant of the government’s relief program, and Ashford Hospitality Trust alone applied for USD 76 million in 117 separate loans, the most by a single company[2]. These companies took advantage of a provision that allowed hospitality and restaurant chains to receive assistance if individual locations had fewer than 500 employees[3].

Ashford companies soon received backlash for exploiting a government loan program designed to help small businesses during a difficult time. Bennett initially refused to return USD 58.7 million his companies received and denied any wrongdoing. On April 28, 2020, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin announced that all companies that had received more than USD 2 million could be audited and held criminally liable for failing to meet the program’s criteria[4]. With mounting public scrutiny and the threat of congressional investigation, on May 2 Bennett declared his companies would return all funds.

A few days later, Douglas Kessler voluntarily resigned as President and CEO of Ashford Hospitality Trust.

Intense media scrutiny and Bennett’s initial refusal to return the funds shone a light onto the companies’ governance structure and poor financial performance. Ashford Inc., which provides asset management services, acts as an external advisor to real estate investment trusts Ashford Hospitality and Braemar. As Chairman of all Ashford companies and CEO of Ashford Inc., Bennett receives compensation from all three entities. These companies were already suffering from heavy losses and sinking stock prices long before COVID-19 struck. Ashford Hospitality had more than USD 100 million in losses in FY 2019. Amid the scandal, the NYSE threatened the company with delisting after its share price fell below USD 1, the minimum average closing price per share required to maintain listing on the NYSE[5]. Overall, the companies’ share prices have fallen over 70 percent on average over the last five years.

Pay for Performance analysis of Ashford Inc.’s CEO

However, the compensation of the Ashford group’s top executives did not decrease due to its poor financial performance. When using CGLytics’ Pay for Performance modeler to consider Ashford Inc.’s relative position compared to its industry peer group, it is revealed that Bennett’s compensation over three years as CEO is disproportionally high compared to the company’s earnings per share. Their CEO’s granted compensation is ranked on the 95th percentile whilst Earnings Per Share (EPS) is ranked in the 5th percentile displaying a misalignment between pay and performance.

Ashford Inc. also received an F grade in Glass Lewis’ Pay for Performance Analysis for FY 2018, meaning that the company’s poor financial performance is not in line with its high compensation levels.

Ashford Inc.’s Pay for Performance Analysis (2019)

Pay for Performance Ashford
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Understanding the skill set of the Board

When analyzing the Ashford companies’ boards through CGLytics’s board composition and expertise tools, it is noticed that directors were unlikely to be effective lines of defense against the public’s backlash. To have an effective response, we would expect to observe board members with governance, financial, legal or risk expertise. Of the seven directors sitting on Ashford Inc.’s board, only three have governance expertise which is derived from their exposure in governance committee roles. The only member with financial expertise, J. Robinson Hays, is dependent, and no members of the board have legal or risk experience. While all directors have worked in real estate, capital management or hospitality, only three – of which two are dependent – have experience in Ashford Inc.’s specific field.

Ashford Inc.’s Board Expertise and Skills Matrix

Ashford Inc.’s Board Expertise and Skill Matrix
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Looking at Ashford Hospitality Trust, only one of the three directors with governance expertise has worked in a compliance and governance role. Only two have financial expertise, with one being the outgoing CEO, and of the two individuals with legal expertise, only one has practiced law. No director has risk experience.

Ashford Hospitality Trust’s Board Expertise and Skills Matrix

Ashford Hospitality Trust’s Board Expertise and Skill Matrix
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Of Braemar Hotels and Resorts’ seven directors, none has risk expertise and only one has held financial roles.

Braemar Hotels & Resorts’ Board Expertise and Skills Matrix

Braemar Hotels & Resorts’ Board Expertise and Skill Matrix
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

From this analysis, few directors held the expertise and skills necessary to advise the companies on the proper course of action. All companies are led by Bennett as Chairman, and the New York Times asserts that the boards are “filled with people with close ties to Bennett,” including a director whose wife’s firm provides services to the entities[6].

Board tenure is also a factor to consider in a board’s effectiveness. While long tenure can have advantages, they can be an issue if members lack the necessary expertise or if they compromise independence[7]. Two of the three boards have an average tenure of almost seven years and Ashford Inc. has only appointed one director in the past six years.

Overall, the effects of public backlash against Bennett and the Ashford companies could have been mitigated with good governance practices and decisions. In order to acquire credibility in the eyes of the public and investors, the companies should consider restructuring their compensation levels and appointing independent directors with the right skills to oversee executive management and add value to the company.

Interested to see how your company stacks up against 5,900 globally listed companies’ governance practices including their ceo pay for performance, board composition, diversity, expertise and skills?

 

Click here to contact CGLytics and learn about the governance tools available and currently used by institutional investors, activist investors and leading proxy advisor Glass Lewis in their proxy papers.

Refererences

[1] https://diligent.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/06/Whitepaper_modern_governance-1.pdf

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-finance-202/2020/04/27/the-finance-202-joe-biden-blasts-big-banks-corporateamerica-over-coronavirus-response/5ea60fc688e0fa3dea9c3036/

[3] https://www.bisnow.com/dallas-ft-worth/news/hotel/ashford-group-of-companies-affiliates-return-controversial-ppp-funding-blame-inconsistentfederal-guidance-104218

[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-28/mnuchin-says-all-relief-loans-of-2-million-will-be-audited

[5] https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1232582/000123258220000019/ahtnyse8-k.htm

[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/business/economy/monty-bennett-small-business-loans-coronavirus.html

[7] https://insights.diligent.com/board-succession-planning/leaving-a-board-removing-board-members-term-limits-and-more

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