Capri Holdings – A Glass Lewis Use Case into Executive Compensation Benchmarking

In this use case, Glass Lewis examine the “additional considerations” regarding the quantitative examination with respect to Capri Holdings, Inc. (formerly Michael Kors Holdings Ltd.) using CGLytics’ analytical tools.

Glass Lewis’ two-pronged approach to executive compensation analysis in the North American market is delineated between the quantitative analysis and a qualitative assessment. The quantitative portion, while anchored by the pay for performance grade, incorporates additional considerations to supplement the standardized pay for performance analysis.

CGLytics’ suite of tools is fast becoming an integral part of the quantitative analysis for the North American market. In July 2019, the Compensation Analysis section became a part of Glass Lewis’ Proxy Paper for S&P 1500 companies in the U.S. and Canada. The page illustrates total realized compensation of CEOs based on data provided by CGLytics. Covering the past three years, realized CEO pay is presented on both an absolute basis and relative to country and industry peer groups developed by Glass Lewis using CGLytics tools.

In the following discussion, we examine the aforementioned “additional considerations” regarding the quantitative examination with respect to Capri Holdings, Inc. (formerly Michael Kors Holdings Ltd.) using CGLytics’ analytical tools.

Review of Capri Holdings’ Compensation Program

On August 1, shareholders gave their appraisals of executive pay practices at Capri Holdings, casting votes in favor or against the compensation packages of its named executive officers. The company is one of the few in the broader markets where multiple named executive officers receive pay at the CEO level or higher. Michael Kors as chief creative officer (CCO) and honorary chair and John Idol as CEO have received largely equivalent pay packages for most if not all of Capri Holdings’ history as a publicly traded company.

Multiple CEO-level pay recipients at individual companies have drawn the ire of shareholders in the past and no doubt will continue to do so in the future. However, executives from the apparel industry who engaged with Glass Lewis note that the industry is distinct in that the parity between chief executive and chief creative officer pay is not uncommon, but CCO pay is rarely reported on the Summary Compensation Table as these officers are not typically considered executives. In Capri Holdings’ case, however, perhaps because of his additional title of honorary chair, Mr. Kors is thus a named executive officer whose pay is subject to scrutiny at the Company’s annual advisory say on pay vote.

Overview of the Pay For Performance Grade and the Compensation Analysis Page:

Despite its dual CEO pay level executives, Capri Holdings received a “C” grade under Glass Lewis’ pay for performance model in each year from fiscal years 2015 to 2018, indicating adequate alignment. But in fiscal 2019, the company received a “D” grade after a jump in equity compensation to Messrs. Kors and Idol pushed Capri Holdings’ three-year weighted average compensation levels up – a move unsupported by the company’s weighted average performance that dipped in this year’s analysis. The analysis concluded that the company paid moderately more than its peers but performed moderately worse compared to peers.

Unique situations such as Capri Holdings’ case demonstrate the benefits that additional quantitative  analyses have had in Glass Lewis’ approach to executive compensation. One might contend that the pay for performance grade penalized Capri Holdings for common industry pay practices of chief creative officer pay, boosting total named executive officer pay above peers that do not also list their chief creative officer as a top executive.

The CGLytics-powered Compensation Analysis page in Glass Lewis’ research provided additional perspective to help consider Capri Holdings’ executive pay situation. Its focus on CEO pay underscored concerns flagged by the pay for performance analysis. In the same year that the company granted $7.5 million in equity incentives to each of Messrs. Kors and Idol, Mr. Idol’s fiscal 2019 total realized pay increased by 210% from $22.2 million to $68.9 million. At the same time, the Compensation Analysis reported that the median CEO total realized pay among industry peers remained relatively stagnant, highlighting the stark difference in realized pay levels for the CEO position at Capri Holdings compared to peers. While many companies often cite retention concerns due to low realized or realizable pay as reasons for significant increases in equity grants, the analysis using CGLytics indicated this to not be the case, at least for realized pay to the CEO.

Additional Perspectives Through CGLytics:

Beyond the Compensation Analysis page, by focusing on CEO pay using the CGLytics’ broader suite of tools, Glass Lewis found evidence to suggest deeper concerns with pay-setting for the short-term incentive. While the company provided Mr. Idol with no LTIP award in 2018 and only $1 million in 2017, the company’s incentives focused on short-term performance made up for the deficiency. Using CGLytics we can observe the following short-term incentive payout comparison to the industry peer median for most of Capri Holdings’ history as a publicly traded company where 2018 represents the most recently completed fiscal year for the company:

In our view, excessive upside opportunities under a bonus plan may unduly incentivize short-term performance and may undermine a long-term focus on company performance among executives. In fact, Mr. Idol received his maximum payout opportunity under the short-term incentive every year since 2012.

Switching gears in 2019, the Company decided to grant Mr. Idol $7.5 million in long-term incentives. Indeed, the grant resuscitated the level of Mr. Idol’s outstanding compensation following the exercise of a significant number of stock options. Mr. Idol exercised options to acquire 906,076 shares in fiscal 2019 – a value of $58.3 million according to the company’s proxy statement. The following chart shows the change in Mr. Idol’s total outstanding awards with the 2018 data representing the company’s fiscal 2019 and showing the net effect of his exercise of options and increased levels of long-term incentive grants during that year:

The effects of the long-term grant on total CEO pay was quite pronounced as seen in the graph below:

Review of GL recommendation:

In the end, an 89% year-over-year jump in Mr. Idol pay placed it at the 85th percentile of CEO compensation compared to the company’s self-disclosed peer group. The pay decisions for fiscal 2019 degraded the alignment between pay and performance in our analysis. Additional analysis into in the quantum of pay for Mr. Idol through CGLytics compounded our concerns. That Mr. Kors’ pay presented similar issues as Mr. Idol’s was also considered.

A deeper dive beyond our initial pay for performance analysis into the CEO’s total direct compensation uncovered a history of over-focus on short-term performance. Capri Holdings’ short-term incentive payouts rose well above the industry median since 2013. Due to the equity grants made to Mr. Idol during the most recently completed fiscal year, his pay spiked 1.2 times the median industry peer level, according to CGLytics’ multiple of median analysis.

As a result of these concerns, and following a qualitative assessment of the pay program, Glass Lewis recommended against supporting Capri Holdings’ executive compensation proposal for the 2019 annual meeting.

Conclusion:

Overall, the additional quantitative analysis using CGLytics underscored the concerns initially highlighted by Glass Lewis’ pay for performance grade by illustrating issues with pay regardless of the impact of Mr. Kors’ compensation on total NEO pay.

Access Glass Lewis’ Say on Pay analysis – Available through CGLytics

Glass Lewis uses CGLytics as it’s global compensation data provider. For the 2020 proxy season our data will provide the basis of Glass Lewis’ Say on Pay recommendations.

 

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The Billionaire Battle Over Oil Part 2: The Oil Giant’s Resolve

In the second part of The Billionaire Battle Over Oil, we look at the outcome of the proposed deal between Occidental Petroleum and Anadarko.

After a contentious few weeks between Carl Icahn’s continuing proxy war against the Occidental Petroleum (Oxy)-Anadarko deal and the awaiting of the passing vote from shareholders in order for the acquisition to be completed, news has once again been made. Not surprisingly, the proposal passed with a 99% vote in favour of the deal that gives them $72.34 per share (based on last Wednesday’s price); Oxy and Anadarko secured the largest deal in the oil and gas industry since Royal Dutch Shell and BG Group.

However, with big deals come big costs, and the aforementioned is no exception. It adds over USD 40 billion to Oxy’s capital structure and leaves the company “with less flexibility to confront commodity price volatility” in the future. It is no surprise that Icahn chose to launch a proxy war and call for a replacement of board members in the wake of the deal.

Not to mention, Occidental Petroleum is selling USD 13 billion of debt to finance the acquisition after receiving more than USD 75 billion in orders for the deal at its peak. That’s the biggest demand for a debt sale since Aramco, but how will this play out?

Occidental will carry out the bond sale in 10 parts, the longest portion being a 30-year bond that yields around 2.25%. Further, to aid in the USD 10-15 billion divestment plan, Oxy has decided to sell off Anadarko assets in Africa to Total SA of France. The company is also searching for a buyer to hold majority control in the pipeline operator Western Midstream Partners LP, which Occidental is slated to inherit after the takeover.

The first week of August saw Occidental hedge nearly 40% of its combined oil production into 2020 as well, all in an attempt to reassure shareholders that dividend payouts will be possible while taking on an increased debt load.

While the deal may be a win from the company’s perspective, analysts and the market have voiced otherwise. Company ratings from analysts covering Occidental shifted, with the most telling from Evercore ISI “The company’s ‘Pledge’ for greater capital discipline and enhanced corporate governance proved fleeting with ROCE to decline significantly due to the Anadarko transaction. The commensurate decline in valuation places OXY at a 10-year low in the equity market.” The deal is claimed to be value-destructive, and the market bared its teeth towards Occidental and its antics; Year to date (YTD) shares are down nearly 26%, off more than 41% from the trailing twelve-month period, and down 30% since the acquisition was announced.

Generally, good financial stewardship hedges against overvalued, high-impact dealings. Thus, it begs the question: how could such a complex deal be so vigorously accepted internally, despite market kickback and open disagreement?

Viewing Occidental’s board of directors and their relevant skills and expertise within CGLytics’ platform, it is apparent that financial expertise and oversight is lacking.

Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s Board Expertise

Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

It is possible that the lack of financial oversight was manifested when Occidental Petroleum decided to move forward with its acquisition and outbid Chevron for Anadarko. Increased financial responsibility may have produced different results, but the oil industry is ridden with mergers, acquisitions, and deals that walk a fine line in terms of good corporate governance practices.

It begs the question if the oil industry is in need of a corporate governance overhaul in the near future, as the story of Oxy-Anadarko is a tell-tale sign that a lack of expertise can lead to a less-than-stellar outcome.

Corporate boards and executive teams increasingly require insights and analytical tools to identify any potential areas of reputational risk. Without this oversight, companies may be targets of activist campaigns and cannot proactively prepare.

To learn more about how CGLytics’ deep, global data set and unparalleled analytical screening tools can potentially help you identify these areas of risk, click here.

Did you miss it? Read the article of The Billionaire Battle over Anadarko (Part 1) here.

About the Author

Rollin Buffington

US Research Analyst

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Barrick Gold Corp, Acacia Mining and Turbulence in Tanzania

Issues involving the mining industry and corporate governance practices are nothing new. And Barrick Gold’s recently deal with Acacia Mining is no exception. After multiple negotiations and tradeoffs in the past, Acacia Mining has agreed to Barrick, the majority shareholder, buying out the remaining minority shareholders.

Barrick Gold Corporation, based in Canada, is one of the largest gold mining companies in the world. It currently holds 262,246,950 shares of Acacia Mining (64% stake in share capital). To gain the remaining 36%, Barrick has proposed a 24.2% premium on the closing price of Acacia shares on July 18. The deal comes in at USD 430 million and will take the company private.

The Acacia CEO, after finally reaching an agreement, stated: “Given all the circumstances, this is possibly the best outcome.”

Perhaps more importantly, is that the deal aims to resolve many of the longstanding public issues between the Tanzanian government and Acacia that have plagued the mining company’s operations.

Two years ago, the Tanzanian government banned the export of mineral concentrates. This movement was due in part because the government believed they had not received a fair share of profits from mining in the country. Two of Acacia’s units came under fire, being handed a USD 190 billion tax bill from the government. This tax bill has since been reduced to USD 300 million.

Additionally, Tanzania recently demanded that Acacia cease use of a waste-storage facility at a core gold mine. These disruptions have crippled operations and caused Acacia’s shares to fall 50% since 2017.

After facing external pressures and at the insistence of minority shareholders, Barrick CEO, Mark Bristow, proposed a higher offer than what was initially proposed to Acacia in May. This was recently accepted.

Shareholder awareness proved a worthy factor here; Acacia shares rallied 20% on the deal and a positive response was received from the Tanzanian government. This is a fine example of shareholders prioritizing the survival of a company.

Delving into Acacia Mining’s board composition, by utilizing CGLytics’ board effectiveness tools in the online platform, provides insights into why the company may not have managed issues as effectively as possible.

Acacia Mining plc’s Board Expertise

Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

The board expertise and skills matrix from CGLytics show that experience in the area of governance severely lacks, however industry and sector, and financial expertise is heavily present. This may provide an explanation to the problematic relations they experienced with the Tanzanian governance. It generates a question of if more governance experience was present on the board, would the situation have been different? While the survival of the company and acceptance of the “best-we-can-get” deal could be attributed to the strong presence of industry and financial expertise.

The recent movements have rekindled, if only just, a better relationship with the government. Because of Barrick’s increased involvement, the Tanzanian government agreed to receive USD 300 million for the tax debt as a gesture of goodwill. The company was also given the option to pay in installments, with an upfront cost of USD 100 million to be paid out in addition.

Furthermore, Barrick was able to negotiate an agreement in which payment to the Tanzanian government is dependent on the export ban being lifted from Acacia and its subsidiaries in the country. In a “give and take” action, the Tanzanian government also claimed a 16% stake in Acacia in the form of Class B shares.

The complex strategy devised is a clear manifestation of the board leveraging its expertise and abilities to secure a better position. Had there been more Governance oversight, perhaps the company would not have encountered such trifles. The devastating government backlash will certainly continue to have an effect for years to come. Nonetheless the Board can rest easy knowing that it has found the best outcome to a longstanding battle, one that could’ve left Acacia and Barrick incapable of recovering.

CGLytics offers the broadest, up to date global data set and powerful benchmarking tools to conduct comprehensive analysis for executive compensation decisions and risk oversight. CGLytics is Glass Lewis’ source for global compensation data and analytics. These analytics power Glass Lewis’ voting recommendations in both their proxy papers and their custom policy engine service. To find out more click here.

About the Author

Rollin Buffington

US Research Analyst

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Proxy Season Lookback: CGG marks first binding ‘non’ on pay in France – A guest blog by Glass Lewis

The 2019 season marked the second opportunity for French shareholders’ to cast retrospective binding votes on executive compensation. And for the first time, shareholder votes prevented the payment of a bonus award, as well as the implementation of a new pay policy.

A guest blog by

The 2019 season marked the second opportunity for French shareholders’ to cast retrospective binding votes on executive compensation. And for the first time, shareholder votes prevented the payment of a bonus award, as well as the implementation of a new pay policy.

In many markets a say-on-pay vote is offered, but under Sapin II legislation, which came fully into effect in 2018, French shareholders get several “says” on remuneration arrangements. The variable payments due to each executive are subject to a series of “ex-post” binding votes (one for each executive) and there is an annual “ex-ante” binding vote on the intended remuneration policy for the current year. In addition, shareholders also get forward-looking advisory votes on severance arrangements.

It’s the binding “ex-post” vote that has drawn the most attention — in particular, the potential implications of how a rejection could affect the organisation, with several possible scenarios. How would an executive react to such a public rebuke from shareholders? To losing the bonus they thought they had earned? Would the board take emergency measures and what could these be, or would continued service prove untenable, prompting an immediate resignation? In 2018 there were several backward-looking compensation proposals that came close to providing answers, with Teleperformance, Vinci, Renault, Technicolor and Atos coming close to failing. But it wasn’t until this year’s shareholder meeting of SBF120 listed CGG, specializing in geophysical services, that shareholders got to see the implications of voting down a CEO’s pay. Well, sort-of.

After changing CEO early in the fiscal year, CGG had a number of proposals covering executive pay on the agenda. Shareholders received two binding, backward-looking votes, covering the FY2018 variable remuneration due to both the current and former CEOs, as well as one binding, forward looking vote, covering the proposed FY2019 remuneration policy of the current CEO, and one advisory forward looking vote on post-termination severance arrangements.

Shareholders voiced their dissent across the board. Support for executive pay proposals ranged from a high of just 56.65% to a low of 38.63%, with two voted down. These were the ex-post, binding vote on the remuneration due to the former CEO Jean-Georges Malcor for fiscal year 2018, and the ex-ante, binding vote on the 2019 remuneration policy for the current CEO, Sophie Zurquiyah.

Besides being historic, the ex-post rejection was somewhat surprising. Mr. Malcor’s variable package contained no surprises and only represented a small fraction of his total quantum for the year. Payment of a €75,000 extraordinary award in respect of a successful debt restructuring may have been viewed as somewhat questionable, especially after CGG decided to pursue a new strategy after his departure in order to recover from a record of poor financial performance. However, the payment was relatively modest, particularly in comparison to the total of €1,626,673, that Mr. Malcor received in respect of fixed salary and a non-competition agreement (the ex-post votes under Sapin II do not cover fixed remuneration). Also surprising was that the award was not unexpected, having been clearly disclosed as part of Mr. Malcor’s forward-looking binding remuneration proposal, which received 96.90% support at the 2018 meeting.

With only 53.52% support, the binding proposal covering variable remuneration due to the current CEO, Sophie Zurquiyah, narrowly avoided the same fate. The binding, forward-looking proposal covering the remuneration policy intended to apply for the current fiscal year was not so fortunate, garnering just 44.3% support. The consequences of this vote are more transparent, and nowhere near as potentially far-reaching, as that of the “ex-post” vote. Instead of the policy terms that had been proposed, Ms. Zurquiyah’s remuneration will continue to be determined by the company’s existing policy, previously approved by shareholders at the 2018 AGM. That may ultimately suit shareholders – while the company had not proposed any material changes to the existing policy, specific details of the 2019 iteration were not fully disclosed.

The company has issued a press release acknowledging the vote results and stating that the board “will consider the adjustments to be made to the Chief Executive Officer’s remuneration policy in order to obtain the shareholders’ approval at the next General Meeting.” It’s unclear if that consideration will include an engagement programme to garner feedback from investors – or what will happen if and when French shareholders reject the variable pay due to a current, rather than former, CEO.

This article was originally published on the Glass Lewis website, 23/07/2019. You can read the article here: https://www.glasslewis.com/proxy-season-lookback-cgg-marks-first-binding-non-on-pay-in-france/ 

About the Author

1030648

Iris Bucelli
Senior Research Analyst at Glass Lewis & Co.,

Irene joined Glass Lewis as Corporate Governance Analyst for Continental Europe in 2017. She specialises in executive compensation analysis of French blue-chip and mid-cap companies. After completing a Masters Degree at the University of Bologna, she worked on international projects in Italy, France and Spain, before landing in Ireland.

Access Glass Lewis’ Say on Pay analysis – Available through CGLytics

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Correcting Founder’s Syndrome: Executive Compensation Practices at Ralph Lauren

Ahead of the Ralph Lauren AGM, CGLytics looks at how CEO pay has changed since the founder’s exit, and how the nominations change the board composition.

Ralph Lauren Corporation, a global leader of premium lifestyle products, is scheduled to hold its 2019 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (AGM) on August 1, 2019. Shareholders attending the AGM will vote on the following resolutions:

  • The election of 4 directors to serve until the 2020 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders;
  • The ratification of the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending March 28, 2020;
  • The approval, on an advisory basis, the compensation of the Company’s named executive officers and the Company’s compensation philosophy, policies, and practices;
  • The adoption of the Company’s 2019 Long-Term Stock Incentive Plan.

 

Election of Directors:

Ralph Lauren has two classes of directors, Class A and Class B. At the upcoming AGM, four Class A directors will be proposed for election: Frank A. Bennack, Joel L. Fleishman, Michael A. George, and Hubert Joly. We note that in 2018, Ralph Lauren increased the size of its Board with the appointment of three new directors, namely Michael A. George, Angela Ahrendts, and Linda Findley Kozlowski, ostensibly to expand the Board’s “diversity of skills and experiences”. These three directors bring to the Board Leadership, Executive, and Industry/Sector expertise, with Michael A. George and Linda Findley Kozlowski being active CEOs in two retail companies and Angela Ahrendts being a former executive of Apple, Burberry Group plc and Kate Spade & Company. In terms of skills, the three individuals bring about Marketing, Sales and Operations knowledge. Nevertheless, the Board still appears to lack Technology and Financial expertise.

However, in addition to the diversity of skills that the addition of the new directors has brought to the board, the company also now maintains a gender diversity level of 50%, well above the market standard for the United States.

Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Executive Compensation:

The third resolution in the agenda is a shareholders’ advisory vote to approve the Company’s executive compensation.

After the Founder, Ralph Lauren, stepped down from his position as CEO, Ralph Lauren has gone through two CEO changes, with Stefan Larsson serving from November 2015 to May 2017, and Patrice Louvet serving since July 2017. As can be seen from the absolute comparison chart generated by CGLytics’ Pay for Performance module, there appears to be a misalignment between CEO compensation and one-year total shareholder return between 2008 and 2015. However, it appears that this misalignment has reduced since Mr. Lauren left the position of CEO. Furthermore, we also see that the total realized compensation for the CEO thereafter has been reduced significantly.

Source: CGLytics' P4P Modeler

CGLytics’ data and analytics are trusted and used worldwide by Glass Lewis, the leading independent proxy advisor, as a basis for their research on companies

CEO Compensation Package Breakdown

Historically, the CEO’s compensation package has primarily focused on his STI opportunity (between 2009 and 2012). However, since then, the CEOs compensation package breakdown has shifted towards long-terms incentives, which now form a greater component of the CEO’s compensation package.

Additionally, in 2017 the performance measures of LTI grants shifted from 3-year Cumulative Operating Margin and Operating Margin to 3-year Cumulative Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and 3-year Relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR) in 2018. Ralph Lauren also added Global digital revenue as a new measure for STI grants, a modifying KPI that could result in an “adjustment of bonuses upwards or downwards by 10%.”

Source: CGLytics' P4P Modeler

Relative Positioning

In comparison to Ralph Lauren’s own disclosed peer goup, the Company’s CEO pay appears now to be line with its peers. Additionally, when reviewing the company’s relative positioning among its peers, there also appears to be a pay for performance alignment between Ralph Lauren’s 3-year TSR and compensation paid to its CEO.

RalphLauren4
Source: CGLytics' P4P Modeler

Ralph Lauren also proposes adopting a 2019 Long-Term Stock Incentive Plan, under which the Company awards equity compensation to executive officers, to replace the current Ralph Lauren Corporation 2010 Amended and Restated Long-Term Stock Incentive Plan. Under the new plan, LTI awards will be determined based on 3-year Cumulative Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and 3-year Relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR).

Overall, we find that although the company has seen shifts in executive leadership over the past few years after Mr. Lauren left the reigns of the company to his successor, we also find that the company’s executive compensation programs have fallen more in line with market norms, correcting a former pay for performance misalignment that extended under Mr. Lauren’s leadership.

To learn how companies can become proactive and support modern governance decision-making, with access to the same insights as activist investors and proxy advisors, click here.

Sources

CGLYTICS DATA AND ANALYTICS   RALPH LAUREN 2019 PROXY STATEMENT

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2019 CEO Pay Review: The Top 50 Highest Paid CEOs

As proxy season progresses and companies file their annual reports, CGLytics surveys the world’s highest paid CEOs (so far) and looks at how executive compensation has grown since the last year.

CEO Pay continued to dominate the AGM season in 2019. As we take a break over the summer, it’s worth reviewing the top 50 highest paid CEOs and seeing how this has changed from 2018.

We also take a look at how the performance of these companies has increased to understand how executives are rewarded for performance.

Key CEO pay take aways from the first half of 2019 :

  • The top 50 total granted compensation has increased by over 300% from 2018 to 2019 ($4.49bn compared to $1.12bn).
  • Although over 50% of the $4.4bn is attributable to one individual’s granted compensation (Elon Musk, Tesla: $2.28bn).
  • Even discounting this outlier, total granted executive compensation increased by 97%.
  • Meanwhile the average growth in market capitalisation was around 3% from 2018.
  • And 1 year Total Shareholder Return (TSR) actually shrank by 1%.

 

Given these significant increases in total granted compensation compared to the value being delivered to shareholders, it’s easy to see why CEO pay and compensation continues to dominate AGM discussions.

Trending Top 50 CEOs

Ranking

CEO

Company

Total Granted
Compensation

Total Realised Pay

TSR in %

TSR 1YR growth in
%point

1

Musk, Elon

Tesla, Inc.

$2,284,044,884
(
54575310%)

$56,380 (513%)

57%

515%

2

Smith, Patrick

Axon Enterprise, Inc.

$246,026,710
(
56433%)

$25,488,720
(
5472%)

565%

592%

3

Zaslav, David

Discovery Communications, Inc.

$129,499,005
(
5207%)

$33,498,259
(
662%)

511%

543%

4

Glancey, Stephen

C&C Group plc

$119,819,023
(
510%)

$1,643,004
(
536%)

50%

62%

5

Hodler, Bernhard

Julius Baer Group Ltd.

$78,813,367
(
54694%)

$2,979,804
(
581%)

640%

639%

6

Levine, Jay

OneMain Holdings, Inc.

$71,532,583
(
516913%)

$71,532,583
(
516913%)

67%

62%

7

Schwarzman, Stephen

The Blackstone Group L.P.

$69,147,028
(
645%)

$69,147,028
(
645%)

50%

51%

8

Legere, John

T-Mobile US, Inc.

$66,538,206
(
5270%)

$42,071,611
(
5243%)

50%

57%

9

Iger, Robert

The Walt Disney Company

$65,645,214
(
581%)

$66,065,073
(
68%)

54%

56%

10

Steele, Gary

Proofpoint, Inc.

$64,730,296
(
5892%)

$54,931,367
(
528%)

66%

510%

11

Charlès, Bernard

Dassault Systèmes SE

$51,098,970
(
577%)

$65,983,199
(
578%)

518%

517%

12

Alber, Laura

Williams-Sonoma, Inc.

$50,758,332
(
5252%)

$28,830,401
(
5224%)

51%

63%

13

Heppelmann, James

PTC Inc.

$49,969,163
(
5403%)

$17,041,464
(
5107%)

536%

546%

14

Freda, Fabrizio

The Estée Lauder Companies Inc.

$48,753,819
(
50%)

$9,387,109
(
683%)

53%

56%

15

Buckley, Henry

Uni-Select Inc.

$47,774,090
(
52687%)

$47,012,426
(
53416%)

630%

634%

16

Handler, Richard

Jefferies Financial Group Inc.

$44,674,213
(
5105%)

$5,951,709
(
5339%)

633%

638%

17

Kilroy, John

Kilroy Realty Corporation

$43,624,774
(
5282%)

$18,204,958
(
622%)

614%

610%

18

Bird, Lewis

At Home Group Inc.

$43,089,790
(
52477%)

$1,614,791
(
63%)

639%

632%

19

Lebda, Douglas

LendingTree, Inc.

$42,318,238
(
629%)

$164,584,011
(
53682%)

636%

628%

20

MacMillan, Stephen

Hologic, Inc.

$42,040,142
(
5275%)

$12,231,622
(
656%)

64%

56%

21

Hogan, Joseph

Align Technology, Inc.

$41,758,338
(
5256%)

$69,763,660
(
5504%)

66%

61%

22

Schulman, Daniel

PayPal Holdings, Inc.

$37,764,588
(
596%)

$41,295,115
(
5328%)

514%

517%

23

Hastings, Reed

Netflix, Inc.

$36,080,417
(
548%)

$4,064,854
(
698%)

539%

547%

24

Roberts, Brian

Comcast Corporation

$35,026,207
(
58%)

$47,400,117
(
640%)

613%

613%

25

Jellison, Brian

Roper Technologies, Inc.

$34,931,318
(
520%)

$142,847,568
(
5103%)

54%

59%

26

Wenig, Devin

eBay Inc.

$34,842,832
(
597%)

$19,946,164
(
566%)

626%

628%

27

Thiry, Kent

DaVita Inc.

$32,017,501
(
5109%)

$13,983,054
(
610%)

629%

632%

28

Kotick, Robert

Activision Blizzard, Inc.

$30,841,004
(
57%)

$4,307,586
(
697%)

626%

622%

29

Wichmann, David

UnitedHealth Group Incorporated

$30,824,112
(
577%)

$22,558,157
(
673%)

515%

518%

30

Dimon, James

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

$30,033,745
(
56%)

$18,136,934
(
687%)

67%

68%

31

Lutnick, Howard

BGC Partners, Inc.

$29,694,152
(
589%)

$17,791,850
(
511%)

643%

659%

32

Stephenson, Randall

AT&T Inc.

$29,118,118
(
51%)

$21,606,548
(
614%)

622%

69%

33

Narayen, Shantanu

Adobe Systems Incorporated

$28,397,528
(
529%)

$67,297,455
(
555%)

529%

534%

 

Benioff, Marc

salesforce.com, inc.

$28,391,846
(
5510%)

$44,183,075
(
662%)

534%

549%

35

Moghadam, Hamid

Prologis, Inc.

$28,201,397
(
546%)

$35,887,540
(
56%)

66%

516%

36

Gorman, James

Morgan Stanley

$28,168,639
(
515%)

$19,299,856
(
652%)

623%

624%

37

Florance, Andrew

CoStar Group, Inc.

$27,555,954
(
5159%)

$18,644,383
(
517%)

514%

520%

38

Greenberg, Robert

Skechers U.S.A., Inc.

$27,361,406
(
5252%)

$11,157,656
(
515%)

640%

637%

39

Umpleby, D.

Caterpillar Inc.

$27,289,513
(
594%)

$14,840,544
(
5171%)

618%

616%

40

Fink, Laurence

BlackRock, Inc.

$26,543,344
(
64%)

$51,471,260
(
561%)

622%

621%

41

Schleifer, Leonard

Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

$26,520,555
(
50%)

$117,840,017
(
524%)

61%

56%

42

Chenault, Kenneth

American Express Company

$24,208,661
(
530%)

$54,431,474
(
642%)

63%

61%

43

Holmes, Stephen

Wyndham Worldwide Corporation

$21,479,166
(
542%)

$50,161,004
(
553%)

629%

669%

44

Johnson, R.

HCA Healthcare, Inc.

$21,419,906
(
524%)

$109,050,692
(
51407%)

543%

544%

45

Banga, Ajaypal

MasterCard Incorporated

$20,379,353
(
59%)

$60,704,447
(
5145%)

525%

528%

46

Brown, Gregory

Motorola Solutions, Inc.

$20,348,558
(
533%)

$69,555,180
(
5137%)

530%

535%

47

Minogue, Michael

ABIOMED, Inc.

$19,243,230
(
587%)

$123,043,867
(
5907%)

573%

585%

48

Casper, Marc

Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.

$18,607,103
(
616%)

$85,476,755
(
5161%)

518%

524%

49

Meyer, James

Sirius XM Holdings Inc.

$17,633,953
(
582%)

$50,452,233
(
5331%)

57%

56%

50

Fairbank, Richard

Capital One Financial Corporation

$17,333,796
(
57%)

$108,527,637
(
557%)

623%

622%

[1] Compensation in USD – exchange rates based on single point of time, end of tax year 2018.

[2] Excludes executives appointed since 2017 season.

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CSR Limited: Strike One on Remuneration Report

At the CSR Limited AGM in June 2019, the remuneration report received 34% of votes cast against which constitutes a first strike for the purposes of the corporations ACT 2001. CGLytics looks at the alignment of pay against performance and some of the key drivers behind the investor response.

CSR Limited, a major Australian industrial company held its Annual General Meeting on June 26, 2019. The board presented three ordinary resolutions and one special resolution to its shareholders. Included in the ordinary business proposal was to consider the re-election of non-executive director, Matthew Quinn, this year. The company also sought to receive shareholders’ support for the financial report, the director’s report and the auditor’s report for the financial year. Another ordinary resolution that was proposed by the board was to approve and adopt the remuneration report for the financial year ended March 31, 2019.

For the special resolution, the board advised shareholders to consider the granting of long-term incentives for Julie Coates, who will be taking up the position of managing director this September 2019.

The board’s expertise ahead of the AGM

CSR’s corporate governance states that the company seeks to maintain a board composed of directors that have a range of collective skills and experience to ensure corporate development. CSR also elaborates that it considers individuals that are highly-experienced in manufacturing, finance, law and other sectors that the company seeks to pursue in the future.

CSR Board Skills Matrix
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Using the Board Expertise functionality of CGLytics’ platform, we were able to gain insight on the current skills of the members of the board. The Skills Matrix functionality also aids companies to identify any skills gaps in its current matrix. For CSR, of the six directors currently sitting on the board, the graph shows that CSR’s strongest expertise is Finance. The second strongest suits of expertise include Corporate Development, Operations, Project Management and Sales. One area where the company is missing a director with specific expertise is in Governance. The company also lacks directors that have any relevant company Industry and Sector experience. However, the upcoming appointment of a new managing director on September 2019, Julie Coates, may be able to alleviate this missing element to the board’s skill set.

Julie Coates’ Expertise from the CGLytics platform

Board Expertise

Pay for Performance

Another board resolution the company was seeking approval on was the remuneration report and financial report. CSR promotes consistency in the remuneration of senior executives by ensuring that the company and individual performance are aligned with their incentives. The company focuses on compensation that generates long-term value for senior executives. The company only uses two performance criteria in the determination of executive compensation: Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and Earnings Per Share (EPS) for the long-term incentive plan in which both have equal weight of 50 percent.

The board states that absolute TSR instead of relative TSR helps align shareholder interests by keeping senior executives focused on increasing earnings and share price. On the other hand, the EPS helps measure the continued growth in earnings of the company and is parallel to the interests of the shareholders.

The CGlytics Absolute Positioning tool allows insight into the relationship between the two performance conditions and the Managing Director’s granted compensation from 2013 to 2018. As indicated in the graph below, there exists significant volatility in the movements of all performance criteria used in the determination of executive pay: TSR and EPS. From 2015 to 2016, CEO pay, EPS and TSR increased. The latter especially increased by 91.6%. From 2017 to 2018, CEO pay increased by 48% and TSR fell by 46.5%.

CSR CEO pay vs EPS and TSR
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

CGLytics’ data and analytics are trusted and used worldwide by Glass Lewis, the leading independent proxy advisor, as a basis for their research on companies. Find out more.

The CGLytics Relative Positioning Pay for Performance Evaluation tool compares CSR’s CEO compensation with that of the company’s own peer group against the peer group’s three-year TSR. The Pay for Performance evaluation demonstrates that CSR’s Total Realized Compensation appears misaligned compared to its peers. The company’s Total Realized Pay ranks above median at 69th percentile while three-year TSR ranks in the 15th percentile.

Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Granting of Rights

In the Annual report for the financial year ended March 31, 2019, CSR disclosed that it developed a performance-related pay which includes both the Short-Term Incentive (STI) and Long-Term Incentive (LTI) plans, both of which are measured against performance conditions.

The plan would utilize the same performance criteria as mentioned above: TSR and Earning Per Share (EPS) over a three-year performance period (April 1, 2019- March 31, 2022) in financial year-end 2020. The two performance conditions will be weighted at 50 per cent of the overall grant.

The board uses an annual growth rate of 14 percent for 75 percent vesting and an 18 percent stretch for a full vesting of rights for the TSR condition. The board also uses a compound growth rate of 5 percent target for a 50 percent vesting and 10 percent stretch for a 100 percent vesting for EPS condition. There was no change in the hurdles applied in 2017, 2018 and 2019.

The board is seeking for the granting of 360,241 performance rights for Julie Coates, the newly appointed managing director. The amount is pro-rata of her one-year long-term incentive remuneration based on her date of appointment on September 2, 2019. The board also proposes that Ms. Coates is entitled to a maximum LTI award of up to 120 percent of her total fixed remuneration.

Highlights of the AGM

At the AGM which took place on June 26, 2019, all the resolutions were passed as ordinary resolutions. However, as suggest in the potential Pay For Performance misalignment demonstrated above, the remuneration report received 34% of votes cast against which constitutes a first strike for the purposes of the corporations ACT 2001.

CGLytics offers the broadest, up to date global data set and powerful benchmarking tools to conduct comprehensive analysis for executive compensation decisions and risk oversight. CGLytics is Glass Lewis’ source for global compensation data and analytics. These analytics power Glass Lewis’ voting recommendations in both their proxy papers and their custom policy engine service.

For more information on how CGLytics’ can support modern governance decision-making and potentially identify any areas of risk, click here.

 

Sources:

CGLYTICS DATA AND ANALYTICS

CSR LTD 2019 NOTICE OF MEETING

CSR LIMITED ANNUAL REPORT

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Bed Bath & Beyond: Cleaning House

New Jersey-based company Bed Bath & Beyond has recently become the target of an activist campaign. CGLytics examines the drivers, the response and the outcomes of this campaign.

New Jersey-based company Bed Bath & Beyond operates 1,533 retail stores as of March 2, 2019. The company has recently become the target of an activist campaign initiative led by a trio of activist investors: Legion Partners Asset Management LLC, Macellum Advisors GP LLC and Ancora Advisors LLC. Jointly, this group of investors owns about 5.2% of the company.

After initially filing for a potential proxy fight, in late April 2019, the activist campaign at Bed Bath & Beyond kicked off with a lengthy presentation from the above entities to the company’s investor base. This presentation criticized almost every facet of the company’s management; from executive pay to individual store design.  The presentation focused particularly on their CEO Steven Temares’ compensation package, which totaled USD 14,605,042 in 2018, while the remaining Named Executive Officers collectively made USD 30,271,726. Temares, who had served in the role since 2003, resigned shortly thereafter.

In response to this campaign, the company’s board has recently seen a significant reshuffle. In May 2019 alone, nine new directors joined the board, five being appointed on May 1, 2019 : Harriet Edelman, Harsha Ramalingam, Andrea Weiss, Mary A. Winston and Ann Yerger. In addition to these new members, another four were appointed to the board effective May 29, 2019, pursuant to an agreement with the activist group: John E. Fleming, Sue E. Gove, Jeffrey A. Kirwan and Joshua E. Schechter. The addition of these new members results in an almost complete board turnover during the past two years, with 12 of the 13 members having joined within that timeframe. Moreover, former directors and co-founders, Warren Eisenberg and Leonard Feinstein were displaced from their positions as co-Chairmen of the board, and granted the status of co-Chairmen Emeriti, with no entitlement to attend board meetings and no voting powers at such meetings.

While the activist campaign calling for an increase in value creation is not new in the field of corporate governance, conflicting ideas about how to best create that value has been a core issue between boards, executive teams, and investors across the business world for years. So why, in this particular case, was the activist campaign successful?

We do note that the company reported its first decrease in sales in conjunction with its first net loss for the FY 2019. However, the company has been lagging behind the median of its own disclosed peer group in several key financial performance indicators such as net income, enterprise value, three-year TSR, and economic profit since at least 2016. Moreover, the CEO’s compensation has outpaced that of the median of the company’s peer group, as displayed in the graph below:

Bed Bath and Beyond’s Disclosed Compensation Peer Group (2018)
Dillard’s, Inc. AutoZone, Inc.
Burlington Stores, Inc. Williams-Sonoma, Inc.
Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. Nordstrom, Inc.
Big Lots, Inc. Macy’s, Inc.
Advance Auto Parts, Inc. L Brands, Inc.
Tractor Supply Company Kohl’s Corporation
Ross Stores, Inc. The Gap, Inc.
O’Reilly Automotive, Inc. Foot Locker, Inc.
Dollar Tree Dollar General Corporation
Office Depot, Inc.
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Moreover, we find that the activists’ criticisms of the CEO’s remuneration may have gained traction when comparing the company CEO’s Total Realized Pay versus its own disclosed peer group for FY 2018. Bed, Bath and Beyond’s Total Realised Pay appears to be out of alignment with the company’s performance.

 

CGLytics’ data and analytics are trusted and used worldwide by Glass Lewis, the leading independent proxy advisor, as a basis for their research on companies

bedbath&beyond2
Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

The CGLytics research team has also taken a deeper look to evaluate the current board. Utilizing CGLytics’ governance and data analytics platform we find that after all changes recently undergone to the board, Bed Bath & Beyond scores extremely well in nearly every category, except for the Director Interlocks and Nationality Dispersion metrics. The board does have several director interlocks, and diversity of nationality also appears low, as 92% of the board is local to the US.

All other effectiveness attributes score high, with most of them having a score of 100, driving the overall health score of the company at 85 points (Excellent), 10 points above the sector average.

These metrics show that the board contains an age gender diverse group of directors with experience and expertise in all areas measured by the CGLytics platform.

bedbath&beyond3
bedbath&beyond4
Source: CGLytics Data

The effectiveness attributes in the chart above are based on the company in question’s governance practices compared to the corporate governance code of the market in which it is primarily based (in this instance, the NYSE Governance Guidelines). The thresholds above are set by empirical research performed by CGLytics. Each attribute receives a score from 0 to 100, with a score of 100 reflecting the best governance practices

In summary, as Bed Bath & Beyond’s stock price has fallen approximately 80% over a five-year span due to potential mismanagement, ineffective business strategy, and a lack of innovation, the recent changes within the structure of the management and advisory team provide a potential clean slate for the company. Interim Chief Executive Officer, Mary Winston will be at the helm looking to captain the ship as the company searches for stability after an intense period of significant upheaval.

Corporate boards and executive teams increasingly require a broader range of analytical tools to identify potential areas of reputational risk, even for controlled companies, which could make them the target for activist campaigns. For more information regarding how CGLytics’ deep, global data set and unparalleled analytical screening tools can potentially help you identify these areas of risk, click here.

CGLytics offers the broadest, up to date global data set and powerful benchmarking tools to conduct comprehensive analysis for executive compensation decisions and risk oversight. CGLytics is Glass Lewis’ source for global compensation data and analytics. These analytics power Glass Lewis’ voting recommendations in both their proxy papers and their custom policy engine service.

Sources

CGYLTICS DATA AND ANALYTICS

Proxy 2018       Proxy 2017       Fox Business       Business Insider       Wall Street journal      Motley Fool

Header Image: Bed Bath and Beyond store by Anthony92931  licensed under the Creative Commons license.

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In this article, CGLytics examines the increasing pressure on Facebook to split the roles of Chair and CEO from founder Mark Zuckerberg and the implications on the company’s future.

Mark Zuckerberg has been Chief Executive Officer of Facebook, Inc. since he founded the company in 2004 and has held the combined position of CEO/Chair since the Company’s IPO in 2012. Shareholders have increasingly voiced their concerns regarding the combination of both roles. Those opposing the combined CEO/Chair position state that it gives Zuckerberg too much control over the company, where minority shareholders already have very little influence. Founder Mark Zuckerberg controls over 51% of the vote although he owns only 13% of the economic value of the firm. Additionally, headlines surround the billionaire founder, as Zuckerberg again failed to address a committee of international lawmakers who are amid an investigation into Facebook’s disinformation, antitrust, and privacy scandals.

Shareholders Try to Force Zuckerberg’s Hand…Again

In light of the above, several investors have banded together and filed multiple shareholder proposals for consideration at the company’s 2019 AGM, which took place on May 30th, 2019, aimed to alleviate their concerns over Zuckerberg’s influence and lack of oversight of the company. Of interest were proposal five and six filed.

Proposal Five: Proposed primarily by NorthStar Asset Management, in conjunction with other groups of shareholders, requesting that each share be given an equal vote. Currently, Class B shares (controlled by Zuckerberg and a small group of others) have 10 times the voting power of Class A shares. They continued in their supporting statement noting “since July 2018, Facebook value dropped as much as 40% due to Management and Board decisions that have not protected shareholder value. By allowing unequal voting power, our company takes public shareholder money but does not provide us an equal voice in our company’s governance…”

Proposal Six: Recommended that the Chair of the Board of Directors operates as an Independent Member of the Board. The supporting statement offers that there exists no form of checks and balances in order to limit Mr. Zuckerberg’s power. The statement continues, “we believe this weakens Facebook’s governance and oversight of management. Selecting an independent Chair would free the CEO to focus on managing the Company and enable the Chairperson to focus on oversight and strategic guidance.” It’s of importance to note that nearly 60% of the S&P 1500 has separated the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairperson as of April 2018. This proposal received the public support of both the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), as well as Trillium Asset Management.

Unsurprisingly, the Board of Directors has concluded with a recommendation to vote against all stockholder proposals mentioned above. However, the requests made through these proposals heavily resemble several that have been proposed in past years.

CGLytics has taken a deeper look into Facebook’s board composition and effectiveness when compared to all other companies in the US market. Utilizing CGLytics’ governance data and analytics in the specialized platform it was discovered that the key area where the company is underperforming, compared to the sector average, lies primarily in the combination of the role of CEO and Chairman.

Facebook Effectiveness Attributes
Source: CGLytics’ board effectiveness data and analysis

The zero score for the CEO/Chair criterion is in sync with the concerns of the shareholders who are seeking the dissolution of the combined position. This is also supported from the NYSE Stewardship guidelines, where the separation of the CEO/Chair position is required. However, taking all other factors into consideration, Facebook’s board composition and effectiveness is rated ‘Very Good’ and higher than the sector average. Even though the CEO/Chair combination has a score of 0, the majority of the other effectiveness attributes rank above the sector average.

The effectiveness attributes in the chart above are based on the company in question’s governance practices compared to the corporate governance code of the market in which it is primarily based (in this instance, the NYSE stewardship guidelines). The thresholds above are set by empirical research performed by CGLytics. Each attribute receives a score from 0 to 100, with a score of 100 reflecting the best governance practices.

The health score of Facebook and of the market is calculated as the average scoring of all of the effectiveness attributes, respectively. Facebook has an average score of 76, with three effectiveness attributes (Nationality Dispersion, Board Independence and CEO/Chair combined) falling under 60, two effectiveness attribute (Gender Equality, Director Interlocks) at 60 points, and the rest of the effectiveness attributes at 100 points.

Source: CGLytics’

Given the repeated failure of such proposals at the company’s most recent AGM, the future of Facebook seems to remain in the hands of Mark Zuckerberg. It comes as no surprise that these proposals would have similar results as those at previous AGMs, given Zuckerberg’s voting power at the firm. However, the increasing regularity of these types of proposals have been making headlines around the company’s governance structure and posing serious questions to the general public regarding Zuckerberg’s current and future role at the company.

Corporate boards and executive teams increasingly require a broader range of analytical tools to identify potential areas of reputational risk, even for controlled companies, which could make them the object of activist campaigns. For more information regarding how CGLytics’ deep, global data set and unparalleled analytical screening tools can potentially help you identify these areas of risk, click here.

CGLytics offers the broadest, up to date global data set and powerful benchmarking tools to conduct comprehensive analysis for executive compensation decisions and risk oversight. CGLytics is Glass Lewis’ source for global compensation data and analytics. These analytics power Glass Lewis’ voting recommendations in both their proxy papers and their custom policy engine service.

Sources

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In the Spotlight – Burberry, the fashion house’s say on pay in focus

Ahead of the Burberry AGM later this month, CGLytics examines the executive compensation components of the proxy vote proposals.

CGLytics, a leading global provider of governance data and analytics, looks at Burberry’s proxy statement, in connection with its compensation proxy vote proposals, ahead of its 2019 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (the “Annual Meeting”), scheduled for July 17, 2019

Included in the Agenda for this year is the approval of the advisory remuneration report. At the Annual General Meeting, a total of Nine directors will be seeking re-election at the meeting. Two long Serving directors of the Board have been announced not to be seeking re-election at the meeting and hence will be retiring at the end of the Annual General Meeting. This year, the Board is proposing a total of sixteen ordinary resolutions and three other special resolutions.

Executive Pay and remuneration report vote outcomes

The Annual General Meeting of Burberry historically had some stand-offs with shareholders and proxy advisors. The remuneration report for the financial year ended March 31, 2014 received only 47.32% of votes in favor. In 2014, then CEO, Christopher Bailey received a realized pay of GBP 7.5 million, which the company admitted that it was a lot of money but was necessary to retain the CEO.  On his appointment, he was also given 500,000 shares in the company, which was worth more than GBP 7 million in 2014. In addition, investors expressed concerns about 1.35 million shares he was allocated before becoming Chief Executive, which had no performance criteria attached to them.  Ahead of the AGM, that year, PIRC (Pensions and Investment Research Consultants) advised its members to vote against the company’s 2014 remuneration report.

For the financial year 2015, Christopher Bailey took a pay cut, in which he received a total pay of GBP 1.9 million as compared to GBP 7.5 million in 2014.  At their 2017 AGM, the remuneration report for the financial year ended March 31, 2017 had 68.52% of votes in support from shareholders who participated in the AGM. Due to the revolt on the remuneration report, Julie Brown who joined the company as Chief Financial Officer in 2017 decided to waive GBP 2.4 million of the remuneration package she agreed a year prior. This included benefits of a GBP 800,000 share award that related to a potential performance payment from her former employer, Smith and Nephew, which was worth less than the Burberry board had previously assumed. Interestingly, advisory group ISS had recommended shareholders to vote down the remuneration report at the Annual General Meeting, declaring unsatisfaction with Ms. Brown’s pay package.

Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

The Remuneration Policy in the spotlight

In line with the UK’s corporate governance code, Burberry submitted its first remuneration policy for shareholders voting at their 2014 Annual General Meeting. The Remuneration policy received 83.92% in support. Before the AGM, The Investment Management Association (IMA), issued a warning about Burberry’s pay policy.

2017 was the last AGM where the remuneration policy was submitted for shareholders’ voting. During the AGM, the remuneration policy had a support of 93.4% votes in favor, which was an improvement on the prior remuneration policy voting outcome.

Ahead of their AGM, the board revised the remuneration policy to avert a possible shareholders’ rebellion. Burberry reduced its executive’s bonus pay and Christopher Bailey also refused his bonus for the 2016/17 financial year. In the Annual report for the financial year ending March 31, 2017, the company disclosed plans to lower the maximum annual salary increase for its top executives from 15% to 10% and proposed that bonus pay outs to be capped at twice the base salary compared to 2.25 times under the previous policy.

In addition, compensation under the executive share plan awards for ‘exceptional performance’ will be reduced from 6 times the salary to 3.75 times, while the maximum award for ‘normal’ performance will fall to 3.25 times the base salary from 4 times under the previous policy. Burberry also reduced pension contributions for new external executive directors from 30% to 20% of salary and scraped ‘sign on’ bonuses. The Shareholding guideline was however maintained at 500,000 shares for the CEO and increased from two times to three times base salary for other executives.

In line with the UK Corporate Code, the remuneration policy is therefore not being submitted for shareholders’ approval given the overwhelming support it received in 2017. The remuneration policy will therefore be put forward for shareholders voting in 2020’s AGM.

CGLytics’ data and analytics are trusted and used worldwide by Glass Lewis, the leading independent proxy advisor, as a basis for their research on companies

Pay for performance

Utilizing CGlytics’ peer composer and pay for performance modeler, we replicated the peer group that Burberry disclosed in its annual report in 2014 and performed a compensation benchmark. The analysis shows that Burberry’s CEO realized compensation was above the median of its peer companies in 2013. In the same year, Burberry’s TSR outperformed its peer companies.

In 2017, Burberry’s CEO compensation practice showed a pay for performance misalignment relative to its peers. The CEO received a compensation package in the amount of GBP 19 million while the peer median pay was GBP 9 million. The company’s total shareholder return for 2017 was 26.6% compared to the median TSR of 32.4% for its peers.

For the financial year 2018, the CEO of Burberry, Marco Gobetti’s, received a total payment of GBP 4.3 million. This is above the median of the FTSE 100 CEO pay of GBP 3.7 million and Burberry’s peer group which is at GBP 4.2 million.

Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

Burberry’s Long-term incentive plan performance metrics are currently weighted as; 50% on Revenue, 25% each on Adjusted Profit before Tax and Adjusted Retail Return on Invested Capital (ROIC).

When comparing Burberry’s CEO pay practice relative to its disclosed peer group, using CGlytics’ pay for performance modeler, it shows a pay for performance misalignment between Revenue and compensation.

Burberry’s CEO 2018 total realised pay ranks below median at the 46th percentile whiles its revenue ranks bottom quartile at the 23rd percentile.

­­Comparing Burberry to its FTSE 100 industry peers, the company again shows a pay for performance misalignment. The CEO’s total realized pay ranks 71st percentile (upper quartile) while revenue ranks in the 29th percentile (bottom quartile).

The analysis performed by CGLytics, may suggest that the company is over-compensating their CEO relative to its peers and the industry.

Source: CGLytics Data and Analytics

CGLytics offers the broadest, up to date global data set and powerful benchmarking tools to conduct comprehensive analysis for executive compensation decisions and risk oversight. CGLytics is Glass Lewis’ source for global compensation data and analytics. These analytics power Glass Lewis’ voting recommendations in both their proxy papers and their custom policy engine service.

For more information regarding how CGLytics’ deep, global data set and unparalleled analytical screening tools can potentially help you make better decisions, click here.

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